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Rights and Queues: 
On Distributive Contests in the Modern State 
KATHARINE G. YOUNG* 
Two legal concepts have become fundamental to ques-
tions of resource allocation in the modern state:  
rights and queues.  As rights are increasingly recog-
nized in areas such as housing, health care, or immi-
gration law, so too are queues used to administer ac-
cess to the goods, services, or opportunities that 
realize such rights, especially in conditions of scarci-
ty.  This Article is the first to analyze the concept of 
queues (or temporal waiting lines or lists) and their 
ambivalent, interdependent relation with rights.  After 
showing the conceptual tension between rights and 
queues, the Article argues that queues and “queue 
talk” present a unique challenge to rights and “rights 
talk.”  In exploring the currency of rights and queues 
in both political and legal terms, the Article illustrates 
how participants discuss and contest the right to hous-
ing in South Africa, the right to health care in Cana-
da, and the right to asylum in Australia.  It argues 
that, despite its appearance in very different ideologi-
cal and institutional settings, the political discourse of 
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“queues” and especially “queue jumping” commonly 
invokes misleading distinctions between corruption 
and order, markets and bureaucracies, and govern-
ments and courts.  Moreover, queue talk obscures the 
first-order questions on which resource allocations in 
housing, health care, or immigration contexts must re-
ly.  By bringing much-needed complexity to the con-
cept of “queues,” the Article explores ways in which 
general principles of allocative fairness may be both 
open to contestation and yet supportive of basic 
claims of rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In South Africa, persons living in intolerable conditions who 
seek housing have been derided as “queue jumpers,” despite their 
claims of basic constitutional and human rights.1  In Canada, those 
who seek to access medical care outside of the State’s provided ser-
vices have been labeled “queue jumpers,” again in the face of claims 
of basic constitutional and human rights.2  In Australia, persons at-
tempting to enter the continent by sea who seek asylum are dismissed 
as “queue jumpers,” notwithstanding their claims of basic human 
rights.3  Deeply divisive, these distributive contests pit queues against 
rights, propelling the importance of the queue and objections to its 
evasion into the same moral, political, and legal universe as rights.  
As a political and legal concept, rights represent the fundamental im-
portance of the dignity of the human person, or of their liberty, or 
their equality with others.  But so too, as a political and legal concept, 
do queues represent the fundamental importance of fairness and or-
der.  The interrelation between the two has not been theorized. 
This Article explores how these two legal concepts––so fun-
damental to questions of dignity, equality, ordering, and distribution–
–interact.  I argue that only the first legal concept (the concept of 
rights) has attracted the normative and conceptual attention that is 
due, and that the second legal concept (the concept of the queue) has 
been strikingly under-theorized, despite its prevalence in legal sys-
tems, especially in deciding questions of resource allocation under 
conditions of scarcity.  The two concepts together forge an ambiva-
lent, interdependent relation:  to be realized, rights appear sometimes 
to prohibit, sometimes to permit, and sometimes to require queues; 
queues, in their turn, appear to create, institute, or displace rights.  I 
aim to show that the lack of attention paid to the legal concept of the 
queue is a result not only of its uncertain relation to other distribu-
tional norms in law, but of the contradictions and the obfuscations 
that the concept produces in political discourse.  I emphasize 
throughout, however, that the role of the queue has become so basic 
to our understanding of law that no effort to disaggregate and there-
fore to understand the legal concept can shift, on its own, the ideolog-
ical role that it plays.  Examining the interrelation of rights and 
queues is therefore a first step in attending to perceived tensions in 
the norms of liberty, equality, and justice in modern settings of con-
 
 1. See infra Part II.A. 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. See infra Part II.C. 
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stitutional government and liberal market-based democracies. 
This Article is organized in three parts.  Part I draws from 
comparative constitutional and international human rights law to de-
fine rights, and from queueing theory and law to define queues.  This 
part also sets out an initial map of the relations between the two con-
cepts.  Part II moves to an analysis of discourse, examining three en-
counters between “rights talk” and “queue talk” in highly charged 
distributive disputes in South Africa, Canada, and Australia.  I exam-
ine the “queue” as a wait list for access to housing, health care, or 
asylum processing.  This queue configures the space in which hous-
ing rights, patient rights, and refugee rights are contested.  In each 
context, rights claimants, perceived as “queue jumpers,” are the focus 
of heated objection by government officials, politicians, and mem-
bers of the public.  This part shows the highly distinct ideological and 
distributional roles in which the concept of the queue is asserted and 
defended, and in which perceived “evaders” of the queue––in each 
instance, asserting claims of right––are treated.  Part III seeks to dis-
aggregate the legal concept of the queue by noting the unresolved 
questions that accompany the political use of the concept and the ob-
fuscations that “queue talk” produces.  It argues that the political dis-
course of queues and “queue jumping” invokes misleading distinc-
tions between corruption and order, markets and government, and 
governments and courts.  And even more significantly, “queue talk” 
obscures the first-order questions on which the resource decisions 
impacting housing, health care, or asylum rights must rest.  After de-
scribing the high stakes of the contests between rights and queues, 
the Article concludes. 
I. RIGHTS AND QUEUES 
A number of different allocation methods are available to dis-
tribute scarce goods:  markets, merit, voting, need, lotteries, arbitrary 
power, queues, and rights.4  In many cases, different methods of allo-
cation work together.  For example, a market-based system of health 
care can be designed according to certain principles of justice, in or-
 
 4. For classic treatment, see, for example, GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, 
TRAGIC CHOICES:  THE CONFLICTS SOCIETY CONFRONTS IN THE ALLOCATION OF TRAGICALLY 
SCARCE RESOURCES (1978) (noting methods of allotment based on markets, political 
allocations, lotteries, and mixed forms); DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
(1999).  For direct comparisons with rights, see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 
YALE L.J. 1286 (2012); Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Needs:  The Myth of Disjunction, in 
LEGAL RIGHTS:  HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 87 (Austin Sarat & Thomas 
R. Kearns eds., 1996). 
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der to allow for exemptions for those in need of urgent medical assis-
tance, but who are unable to pay.  Indeed, that is a basic template for 
ordering in modern liberal capitalist democracies.  In the definition 
provided in this Article, queues implement a principle of “first come, 
first served,” and allocate first to those who have waited longest,5 
while at the same time often controlling for other modes of ordering 
preferences by allowing for exemptions (on grounds of need or other 
criteria) or by setting categories of recipients in line with each other, 
using “first come, first served” within each category.  In turn, rights 
operate as political “trumps” when certain important values, such as 
liberty or dignity, are infringed,6 or at least require an appropriate 
reason, over majoritarian or utilitarian objections, before such in-
fringement is justified.7  The mechanisms of rights and queues some-
times compete and sometimes work together in settling distributive 
questions.  Because so much of this relation rests on definitions, this 
Part first describes the contemporary role and function of rights in 
comparative constitutional and human rights law and the operation of 
queues in varied legal and extra-legal settings before moving to ad-
dress the relation between the two. 
A. Rights in Law 
One might describe ours as the age of rights.  In contempo-
rary political discourse, few concepts now rival the discursive moral 
power of the idea that every person has inherent dignity and basic 
 
 5. “First come, first served” reflects the most common discipline of queues in 
everyday life and is the one under study in this Article; other queue disciplines may follow a 
principle of “last come, first served” (inventory systems), “last in, first out” (employment 
law), or random order selection, where queues operate much like lotteries.  See, e.g., 
DONALD GROSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF QUEUEING THEORY 3 (4th ed. 2008). 
 6. For seminal analysis of this conception, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1977).  For alternative philosophical conceptions that are distanced from the 
“trumps” formulation, see, for example, ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS (Julian Rivers trans., 2002) (presenting constitutional rights as principles that 
demand optimization); THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER:  MAJOR POLITICAL ESSAYS, SPEECHES, 
AND DOCUMENTS FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT (Micheline R. Ishay ed., 2d ed. 
2007) (presenting codified human rights in different historical phases). 
 7. ALEXY, supra note 6; STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM:  THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013); MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, 
STRONG RIGHTS:  JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008); Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights as Principles:  On the 
Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 574 (2004) (reviewing 
ALEXY, supra note 6). 
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rights, which others ought to respect.8  Since at least the end of the 
Second World War, the development of a comprehensive interna-
tional law of human rights9 and the corresponding growth in constitu-
tional bills of rights around the world10 have buttressed this idea and 
expanded it.  Laid within its Westphalian architecture, the age of 
rights corresponds with the duty of modern states to respect them as 
matters of law.11  And laid within a more expansive conception of 
human freedom than the eighteenth century declarations of the 
“rights of man,” such rights now commonly include economic and 
social rights and require the modern state to respect, protect, and ful-
fill them.12  Claims of “rights” have now entered into contested areas 
of social policy, such as housing, health care, education, and immi-
gration.13  These claims include new articulations of the material di-
 
 8. E.g., Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
315 (2004); see also John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, in FREEDOM FROM 
POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT:  WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? 75, 75 (Thomas Pogge 
ed., 2007) (noting the “discourse of human rights [has acquired] in recent times . . . the status 
of an ethical lingua franca”). 
 9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (entered into force in 1976); International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (entered 
into force in 1976); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 10. For recourse to the primary text of all of the world’s constitutions, see, for 
example, CONSTITUTE, http://www.constituteproject.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) 
(collecting texts and highlighting their parallels with each other and with international law).  
For analysis, see, for example, Zachary Elkins et al., Getting to Rights:  Treaty Ratification, 
Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61 (2013).  
Convergence between constitutional rights and human rights follows many paths.  See, e.g., 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:  THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Vlad Perju, Constitutional 
Transplants, Borrowing, and Migrations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
 11. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 9; ICESCR, supra note 9; UDHR, supra note 9; Louis 
Henkin, The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights, 506 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 10 (1989) (presenting this early architecture); cf. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE HARD 
QUESTIONS (Cindy Holder & David Reidy eds., 2013) (collecting viewpoints on the 
problems with this general architecture). 
 12. E.g., ICESCR, supra note 9; Francesca Bignami & Carla Spivack, Social and 
Economic Rights as Fundamental Rights, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 561 (2014); David S. Law & 
Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
762 (2012). 
 13. This Article does not discuss the right to education, arguably the most universally 
recognized (in law) of the (as-categorized) economic and social rights.  Much of the 
discussion could certainly be tested in this policy domain.  See, for example, the rigorous 
examination of justice principles behind the distribution of educational opportunities in 
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mensions of liberty and the government’s positive role in responding 
to shortcomings in the enjoyment of that liberty.14  Such “positive,” 
“second-generation,” or “welfare” rights immediately call forth the 
question of priority, although such questions arise with civil and po-
litical rights as well, as will be shown below.  It is at the point of pos-
itive provision, however, that the relation between rights and queues 
is most in need of analysis.  For this reason, this Article selects, in il-
lustrating the tensions between rights and queues, examples of prom-
inent contestations around rights to housing, health care, and asylum. 
The language of rights expresses “individualistic considera-
tions,”15 which may be characterized in terms of their special im-
portance to securing fundamental values such as freedom, dignity, or 
equality,16 and in terms of their systematization within broader con-
ceptions of justice or political morality.17  Rights, conceptualized as 
human rights or constitutional rights, have been legally instituted in 
the texts of international declarations on how states must treat indi-
viduals, constitutional texts, and statutes, and in the interpretive 
stances that judges apply to common or civil law.18  But rights also 
 
MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE:  AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL 
TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1997).  Similarly, affirmative action 
policies, in areas of education and employment, raise tensions and interrelations between 
rights and queues that are worthy of mapping against the analysis of Part III.  For example, 
in a prominent case in U.S. constitutional law, Abigail Fisher’s claim of having her own 
place denied due to the admissions slots reserved for other applicants in the University of 
Texas’s admission policy relies on a queueing narrative which reduces much of the 
complexity of the admissions process.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 
(2016).  Other waiting lists, administered by first-come-first-served and other principles, 
have distinct legal roles in the United States in the health care, housing, and immigration 
policy domains examined in this Article.  Queues are also at work in the discrete systems of 
allocation in the United States’s extensive prison system, for example, and in welfare 
administration, water rights allocations, and child adoption laws.  While analysis of the role 
of waiting lists in the United States is beyond the scope of the present Article, the political 
resonance of the metaphor bears compelling affinities with the present discussion, especially 
when it is used to express an anterior sense of privilege against perceived newcomers.  See 
infra note 337. 
 14. See, e.g., CÉCILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION:  GOVERNMENT 
AND THE DECENT LIFE 47–49 (2000); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:  SUBSISTENCE, 
AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1996); KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012); Sen, supra note 8. 
 15. For a useful presentation of the diversity of conceptions of rights, see Jeremy 
Waldron, Introduction, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 1 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). 
 16. DWORKIN, supra note 6; Sen, supra note 8. 
 17. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (REV. ED. 1999); see also Waldron, supra note 
4. 
 18. ICCPR supra note 9; ICESCR supra note 9; UDHR supra note 9; see also YOUNG, 
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exist in the “slogans and polemics of political debate.”19  In answer to 
a number of unsettled questions about constitutional and human 
rights, this Article assumes that they should be understood as both 
moral and legal entitlements; that they are validated by processes of 
deliberation as well as reason; that an alleged infringement demands, 
at the very least, a heightened level of justification; and that they in-
clude material interests, such as food, health care, housing, and edu-
cation that are necessary for the protection of particular values.20 
Already, the inclusivity of such assumptions suggests the 
permissibility of some sort of co-existence between rights and 
queues.  But this choice reflects modern trends in comparative and 
international law, if not in U.S. constitutional law itself.21  Many na-
tional constitutions now recognize economic and social rights within 
their bills of rights.  The latest textual survey recorded the inclusion 
of such guarantees as the rule, rather than the exception, with the 
greatest number of such rights entrenched in Latin America and the 
post-communist states.22  In ever more countries, the infringement of 
economic and social rights now gives rise to justiciable complaints, 
either expressly or via the interpretive practice of courts.23  In inter-
 
supra note 14; infra text accompanying notes 110–113 (describing basic legal design of 
rights-implementation and enforcement in South Africa, Canada, and Australia). 
 19. PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:  THE 
SUCCESSOR TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:  LAW, POLITICS AND MORALS 
489 (2013). 
 20. These assumptions, while supported in constitutional theory, see, e.g., YOUNG, 
supra note 14; Waldron, supra note 15, are also applicable to the positive law undergirding 
the three rights in the three jurisdictions dealt with in Part II below.  Any departures from 
these assumptions are noted in more detail in that Part. 
 21. Compare, DWORKIN, supra note 6, with Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an 
Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094 (2015) (noting the posture of balancing can 
apply to rights); see also Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 203 (2008) (proposing an approach that would resituate welfare rights in U.S. 
constitutional law); Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law:  
Explaining America Away, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663 (2008). 
 22. Courtney Jung et al., Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, 62 
AM. J. COMP. L. 1043, 1047 (2014). 
 23. Id. at 1046 (suggesting that one-third of all constitutions identify all of their 
economic and social rights as justiciable, with another third reserving justiciability for some 
rights only, and others containing only aspirational rights, or containing less than two).  This 
categorization is useful, with the obvious caveat that constitutional text does not always 
reflect constitutional practice.  See, e.g., Atudiwe P. Atupare, Reconciling Socioeconomic 
Rights and Directive Principles with a Fundamental Law of Reason in Ghana and Nigeria, 
27 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71 (2014); Katharine G. Young, On What Matters in Comparative 
Constitutional Law:  A Comment on Hirschl, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1375 (2016); Madhav Khosla, 
Making Social Rights Conditional:  Lessons from India, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 739 (2010). 
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national human rights law, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, ratified by 164 states, now has its own 
quasi-adjudicatory mechanism.24  The treaty’s committee has issued 
its first response to an individual complaint.25  A widely accessible 
and growing jurisprudence on economic and social rights26 informs 
the arguments and decisions of NGOs, lawyers, governments, and 
judges in networks that are often indistinguishable from the civil and 
political concerns of more traditional constitutional and human rights 
advocacy.27  Such jurisprudence centers on the questions of legiti-
mate priority setting in the “progressive realization”28 of economic 
and social rights through three main routes:  setting the content of a 
 
 24. G.A. Res. 63/117, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 10, 2008) (twenty-one Parties, forty-five Signatories as of 
December 1, 2016). 
 25. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Communication No. 2/2014:  
Views Adopted by the Committee at Its Fifty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 
(Oct. 13, 2015) [hereinafter I.D.G. v. Spain]. 
 26. E.g., ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Aoife 
Nolan ed., 2014); EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS:  BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Daphne 
Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007); SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE:  EMERGING 
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008). 
 27. The metaphor of migrations has been popular for comparative constitutional ideas.  
Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE 
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).  For an analysis of 
human rights ideas outside of courts, see BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS:  INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).  For analysis of earlier trends 
in human rights advocacy, especially in the United States, omitting economic and social 
rights, see SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA:  HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).  For 
documentation of such networks, particularly in relation to economic and social rights, see 
generally SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE:  CRITICAL INQUIRIES 
(Helena Alviar García et al. eds., 2015); STONES OF HOPE:  HOW AFRICAN ACTIVISTS 
RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY (Lucie E. White & Jeremy 
Perelman, eds., 2011). 
 28. See ICESCR, supra note 9, art. 2(1) (requiring States Parties to “progressively” 
realize economic, social, and cultural rights).  This is in contrast with obligations to 
“respect” (immediately) civil and political rights under the ICCPR.  See ICCPR, supra note 
9, art. 2(1).  Progressive realization requires the state to “take steps” according to “available 
resources.”  BEN SAUL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS:  COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 137–57 (2014).  While later 
human rights treaties, which combine civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights 
together, eschewed the progressive realization formulation, the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, reverted to this formula for 
economic and social rights.  Id. art. 4(2).  But for the suggestion that the “minimum essential 
level of enjoyment” requires immediate respect under that Convention, see U.N. Office of 
the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Monitoring the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities:  Guidance for Human Rights Monitors 28 (2010), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Disabilities_training_17EN.pdf. 
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non-derogable, or otherwise prioritized, “minimum core”;29 setting 
out standards of “reasonableness” or “proportionality” in state re-
sponses;30 or prioritizing “negative” over “positive” obligations.31  
Each of these debates assumes, without analysis, that certain rights-
holders are to be given priority and that others must wait before their 
rights claims are addressed. 
Despite this growing practice around economic and social 
rights, on which the assumptions of this Article rest, fundamental 
questions remain about the legitimacy of rights claims in the distribu-
tional sphere, foremost of all being the pervasive perception that such 
rights are “positive rights” that require state action, rather than “nega-
tive rights” that require state restraint.  This central positive/negative 
binary is noteworthy, not only for its longevity, in the face of exten-
sive and convincing analysis of its shortcomings,32 but also for the 
ease with which it accommodates the concept of queues.  The more 
accurate demarcation of positive and negative duties, associated with 
all rights, rather than the so-called positive and negative rights, is de-
scribed in more detail below.33  In short, queues appear to be an ap-
propriate method for fulfilling “positive” duties; yet at the same time, 
many who seek to evade the queue are seeking to assert claims of 
“negative” duties (to be allowed to buy health care, for instance, or to 
be protected from eviction).  These interests are pitted against those 
 
 29. Cf., e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 
3:  The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (art. 2, para. 1 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. 
E/1991/23 (1990); David Landau, The Promise of a Minimum Core Approach:  The 
Colombian Model for Judicial Review of Austerity Measures, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 26, at 267; Katharine G. Young, 
The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights:  A Concept in Search of Content, 33 
YALE J. INT’L L. 113 (2008). 
 30. SANDRA LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS:  ADJUDICATION UNDER A 
TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION (2010); Katharine G. Young, Proportionality, 
Reasonableness, and Economic and Social Rights, in PROPORTIONALITY:  NEW FRONTIERS, 
NEW CHALLENGES (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., forthcoming). 
 31. On the more idiosyncratic approaches between constitutional systems with respect 
to economic and social rights, as opposed to the apparently converging approaches to civil 
and political rights, see Daniel M. Brinks et al., Social Rights Constitutionalism:  
Negotiating the Tension Between the Universal and the Particular, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 289, 297–300 (2015); Colm O’Cinneide, The Problematic of Social Rights—Uniformity 
and Diversity in the Development of Social Rights Review, in REASONING RIGHTS:  
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 299 (Liora Lazarus et al. eds., 2014). 
 32. E.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS:  WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP:  
TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002); see also SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED:  
POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES (2008). 
 33. See infra Part I.C. 
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who remain in their “correct” place in the queue, who can be charac-
terized as enjoying rights with “negative” duties (to be left alone), or 
“positive” duties (to having the interest in the queue fulfilled).  Thus, 
as will be seen below, this binary is misleading in relation to queues, 
as it is for rights. 
B. Queues in Law 
The concept of queues has a less developed analytical pedi-
gree in law.34  Nonetheless, the concept is a familiar one in both for-
mal and informal systems of ordering and harbors its own normative 
commitments—to equality, for example, or transparency—that ap-
pear to compete with the value claims of rights.  This Article defines 
the queue as a resource allocation method that ranks those who seek 
access to goods, services, or opportunities, and gives priority in order 
of entry.  This definition is closely tied to current law.  Queues can 
operate as a legal rule, procedure, or practice.  In property law, for 
example, competing claims to property in wild animals are decided 
according to first occupancy.35  In compensation mechanisms for 
mass torts, claims are processed according to “first in, first out,” with 
only claimants confronting financial need allowed to skip to the front 
of the line.36  In commercial dealings, conflicts between security in-
terests on debtor’s property are resolved in accordance with the time 
of filing or perfection.37  As commentators contend, a general rule of 
 
 34. This is not to say that analytical energy has not been applied elsewhere.  See, e.g., 
GROSS ET AL., supra note 5 (detailing applications in engineering, mathematics, marketing, 
customer service, and other fields).  For two notable exceptions in law, see Kevin Gray, 
Property in a Queue, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 165 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo 
M. Peñalver eds., 2010); Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1595 (2014). 
 35. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805); Alfred L. Brophy, Introduction:  A 
Famous Fox, a Surfacing Whale, and the Forgotten Slave, 27 L. & HIST. REV. 145, 146 
(2009); cf. Symposium, Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 
661 (1986) (comparing notions of first possession and conquest).  Gray suggests that 
analogues of queueing and property acquisition are entrenched in the structure of property 
law.  Gray, supra note 34, at 172–76. 
 36. See, e.g., Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil 
Liability, 86 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2011); see also Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First:  
Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541 (1992). 
 37. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).  An 
earlier rule for distribution during bankruptcy was based on first in first out queues; this was 
later revised to distribution pari passu (a principle of equal footing) among all creditors, 
subject to level of security.  See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY (6th ed. 
2014); Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Priority as Pathology:  The Pari Passu Myth, 60 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 581, 592 (2001).  The strict priorities imposed upon interests can be reordered by the 
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“first in time, first in right . . . runs like a golden thread through all 
priority schemes.”38 
Such a thread appears to run through many informal settings 
of ordering as well.  In this respect, queues appear an almost univer-
sal, if culturally variable, system of ordering in conditions of scarcity, 
or in conditions where simultaneous provision is not possible.  In ex-
amining a system of informal norms of queueing, Neil MacCormick 
emphasized not only the informal prompt of groups to self-organize 
in rank, but also the expectation that others observe the priority-norm 
and “respond critically or even obstructively towards people who 
flout” it.39  MacCormick’s insight here highlights not only the infor-
mal self-organization toward queueing, but the way in which people 
feel justified in giving social sanctions to those who jump the queue, 
or cut in line, in the absence of any law.  Often, this is a question of 
the trust and cooperation that is available to self- and extra-legally-
enforce this system.40  Law also steps in to endorse and enforce these 
informal ordering systems, particularly in times when trust and coop-
eration are low.41 
That the queue is readily understood and socially enforced42 
is more pronounced in some cultures than others.  Queues represent 
“an overlapping, largely shared, common understanding of the right 
way to behave,”43 but this is culturally, just as it is historically and 
jurisdictionally, contingent.44  For example, queues are sometimes 
 
doctrine of equitable subordination, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 510(c), which allows a 
bankruptcy court to relegate even a secured claim to a lower tier in order to restore a just 
hierarchy. 
 38. 4 JAMES J. WHITE ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 428 (6th ed. 2010); see also 
Perry & Zarsky, supra note 34, at 1596. 
 39. Neil MacCormick, Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts, 17 L. & PHIL. 301, 
305 (1998). 
 40. Leon Mann, Queue Culture:  The Waiting Line as a Social System, 75 AM. J. SOC. 
340 (1969).  Differences in trust may be one reason why queueing for a recreational good or 
service inculcates a different sense of camaraderie from queueing for a necessary good or 
service like transport or the postal system.  JOE MORAN, QUEUEING FOR BEGINNERS:  THE 
STORY OF DAILY LIFE FROM BREAKFAST TO BEDTIME 70–71 (2008). 
 41. For example, after Hurricane Sandy, queues in gas stations were enforced by 
police.  Elizabeth A. Harris, A Slow Return to Normal Skips the Gas Station, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/nyregion/gas-rationing-is-new-burden-
after-hurricane-sandy.html. 
 42. Mann, supra note 40. 
 43. MacCormick, supra note 39, at 308–09. 
 44. I make no naturalist argument here, but it bears mentioning that simple hierarchical 
orderings have been tracked in a variety of non-human animals, undergirding a field in 
biology known as social queue analysis.  See, e.g., Hiroshi Toyoizumi & Jeremy Field, 
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thought of as a quintessentially Western consumer practice.45  The 
British have been described as having mastered the art of the queue;46 
Americans, too, avidly follow the practice, although it is usually de-
scribed as “waiting in lines,” not “queues.”47  Slightly different 
norms of queueing exist in Nordic countries:  for example, time-outs 
are often socially acceptable.48  Yet culture is a malleable concept, 
and cultural practices respond to institutional conditions.  In Eastern 
Europe during communism, queueing was an unavoidable part of 
everyday life.49  In contemporary China, the rise of urbanization has 
brought with it lengthy queues.50  The end of apartheid in South Afri-
 
Dynamics of Social Queues, 346 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 16 (2014) (documenting, in the 
case of wasps, age-based queues that predictably determine the inheritance of resources or 
social status for individuals). 
 45. E.g., Henry J. Ssali, Jumping the Queue, AFR. NEWS SERV., May 28, 2007 
(comparing the need to “hustle” in Uganda with the respect for queues in the U.K., 
Germany, and South Africa). 
 46. See, e.g., MORAN, supra note 40, at 60–71 (describing a social history of queueing 
in Britain, and detailing practices in the early nineteenth century, the Second World War and 
post-Thatcher Britain).  See also Gray, supra note 34, at 178 (noting the “Anglo-Saxon” 
histories of queueing). 
 47. Apparently the terminology of the “queue” is rapidly gaining acceptance in the 
United States.  GROSS ET AL., supra note 5, at 1–2.  For a broader analysis of the arguably 
more time-conscious culture of the United States, including how family time is prioritized 
alongside work, see TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE:  LAW AND THE BALANCE 
OF LIFE 6–7, 139 (2002); see also MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF 
CAPITALISM 157 (Talcott Parsons trans., Dover 2003) (1905) (noting the rise of an ethic of 
work that saw wastefulness of time as “the first and in principle the deadliest of sins”). 
 48. MacCormick, supra note 39, at 311 (noting that a line-stander could depart, with 
the help of a numbered ticket, and not lose her place); see also David Fagundes, The Social 
Norms of Waiting in Line, L. & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming) (describing lines for sports 
tickets at Duke University, with scheduled check-in to ensure queuers’ continued wait); 
Mann, supra note 40 (describing lines for Australian Rules Football, with some permissible 
absences). 
 49. A famous Russian novel records the phenomenology of the queue during 
communism.  VLADIMIR SOROKIN, THE QUEUE 256–57 (Sally Laird trans., 2008) (1985) 
(describing the “interminable lines . . . for everything—for bread, sugar, nails, news of an 
arrested husband, tickets to Swan Lake, furniture, Komsomol vacation tours[,] . . . [and] the 
toilet. . . .  Soviet citizens spent a third of each day standing in lines”).  Indeed in Bolshevik 
Russia, in 1917, the commercial newspaper Kommersant had announced that queues were 
the “law of our time.”  JULIE HESSLER, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SOVIET TRADE:  TRADE POLICY, 
RETAIL PRACTICES, AND CONSUMPTION, 1917–1953, at 22 (2004).  In describing queues in the 
former GDR, social historian Joe Moran notes the principle of “deferred gratification” that 
was used to justify their ubiquity.  MORAN, supra note 40, at 64. 
 50. Ian Johnson, As Beijing Becomes a Supercity, the Rapid Growth Brings Pains, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/20/world/asia/in-china-a-
supercity-rises-around-beijing.html.  While Johnson’s report tracks the rise of more 
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ca allowed for new, desegregated queues.51  In journalist accounts, 
queueing prowess has been described as the “cornerstone of civilisa-
tion”;52 a failure to respect queues has been linked to political insta-
bility in government,53 and entrepreneurial instability in business.54 
Notwithstanding these different cultural affinities with 
queues, there is universality in the normative values they purport to 
uphold.  They appear to promote the values of both fairness and or-
der.  In terms of the former, queues lay claim to rival notions of fair-
ness that are purportedly settled by rights.  In this sense, the queue 
represents two important distributive values:  equality and desert.  
First, queues are blind to the interpersonal differences that should be 
irrelevant to questions of distribution, such as eye color in a queue 
for food.55  Queues ensure that services or opportunities are distribut-
ed on a “ground that is universalistic rather than personally discrimi-
natory,”56 and thus not on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, 
 
disciplined norms of queueing for transportation services, this is not to say that China has 
adopted, wholesale, the distinctively orderly waiting systems that can be more commonly 
observed in other Asian settings (such as Japan), especially for high speed options.  See, e.g., 
Lance Heiko, Some Relationships Between Japanese Culture and Just-in-Time, 3 ACAD. 
MGMT. EXECUTIVE 319, 320 (1989) (noting the marked areas on station platforms that 
delineate queueing space).  One example, from queueing theory, compares the strict first in 
first out queueing discipline for urban railway services in Japan with the random-access 
queueing in the United States.  See Yuichiro Yoshida, Commuter Arrivals and Optimal 
Service in Mass Transit:  Does Queuing Behavior at Transit Stops Matter?, 38 REGIONAL 
SCI. & URB. ECON. 228 (2008). 
 51. Nadine Gordimer, Standing in the Queue, 41 INDEX CENSORSHIP, July/Aug. 1994, 
at 148 (describing the new experience of waiting to vote in post-apartheid South Africa).  
Two decades later, record queues were again observed for those paying their final respects to 
Nelson Mandela.  David Smith, Nelson Mandela's Lying in State Draws Queue of 
Thousands to Say Goodbye, GUARDIAN (London) (Dec. 11, 2013) https://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2013/dec/11/nelson-mandela-lying-in-state-thousands-say-goodbye. 
 52. Damian Barr, The Waiting Game, TIMES (London), Nov. 28, 2009, at 28.  As a 
human geographer has put it, norms of civility may be enhanced in highly visible queueing 
spaces.  See Stuart Corbridge, Waiting in Line, or the Moral and Material Geographies of 
Queue-Jumping, in GEOGRAPHIES AND MORALITIES:  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
DEVELOPMENT, JUSTICE AND PLACE 183, 185 (Roger Lee & David M. Smith eds., 2004). 
 53. Ssali, supra note 45. 
 54. Vartuhí Tonoyan et al., Corruption and Entrepreneurship:  How Formal and 
Informal Institutions Shape Small Firm Behavior in Transition and Mature Market 
Economies, 34 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 803 (2010).  For development of these 
associations, see infra Part III.A.I. 
 55. BILLY EHN & ORVAR LÖFGREN, THE SECRET WORLD OF DOING NOTHING 42 (2010) 
(noting that “being beautiful, wealthy, or well-connected should mean nothing once you are 
standing in line”). 
 56. MacCormick, supra note 39, at 307. 
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race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, socioeconomic status, or oth-
er grounds.  Such discrimination is also impermissible, of course, in 
theories of rights, unless required affirmatively on grounds of sub-
stantive equality.  Moreover, the relevant criteria of distribution or 
provision––the time of entry––appears to vindicate equality by treat-
ing equally every person’s time.57  As well as equality, queues es-
pouse the value of desert, since they allocate on the basis of a per-
son’s own conduct (arriving/filing/registering early, and waiting in 
line).  This justification is evident in the “first in time, first in right” 
principle, espoused above.58  This value is a greater rival to the fun-
damental values upheld in modern theories of rights, which may de-
part from desert-based justifications entirely.59  Yet, while these sys-
tem features purport to uphold equality and desert, this may be more 
apparent than real, because more affluent participants often have the 
resources necessary to strategically adapt to early entry or waiting 
substitutes.60  Certainly, gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, 
religion, age, disability, and socioeconomic status are grounds that 
may determine not only time and ability to wait in line, but also entry 
into the queue at all.61  And more significantly, the lack of propor-
tionality between effort (time invested) and result in different queue-
ing systems means that they may flout a desert-based justification 
anyway.62 
 
 57. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 34, at 1611.  For a fuller discussion of the value of 
time, see infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 58. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805); see also Gray, supra note 34, 
at 173–76. 
 59. Desert may fail to pass the required normative justification, as well as being an 
unreliable principle for identifying valued activities.  See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE 
UNDESERVING POOR:  AMERICA’S ENDURING CONFRONTATION WITH POVERTY (2d ed. 2013); 
MILLER, supra note 4; Richard J. Arneson, Egalitarianism and the Undeserving Poor, 5 J. 
POL. PHIL. 327, 331 (1997). 
 60. See Mokal, supra note 37, 609–16 (noting problems with equality justifications for 
ranking creditors in bankruptcy); infra Part III.A.2 (discussing use of markets). 
 61. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing, for example, the advantages that young men have 
compared to women, children, and the elderly when seeking asylum or escaping persecution 
in the first place); infra note 197 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.A.2 
(discussing the ability of the wealthy to opt out of queues).  Thus, even if the queue itself 
treats everyone equally, it may often have biases structured within its terms of entry. 
 62. See, e.g., Perry & Zarsky, supra note 34, at 1618.  The investment of time may 
appear a poor basis for desert when government distribution should be guided by broader 
properties of virtue or effort.  Desert theorists have identified properties such “as being a 
citizen; having been unjustifiably harmed by a government agency; having earned a lot of 
money; being keen on getting into business; being vulnerable to robbers and muggers who 
might attack.”  Fred Feldman & Brad Skow, Desert, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/desert; cf. RAWLS, supra note 17, 88–89 
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As well as certain values of fairness, queues are said to reflect 
and promote the values of order and civility, but this too is unrelia-
ble.63  In conditions of scarcity, queues prevent chaos and disorder.  
Compared with other allocation methods, administrative costs are 
low because of the ease of explaining the method of allocation, moni-
toring compliance, and resolving disputes.64  This brings obvious 
gains in efficiency.  Nonetheless, because queues are insensitive to 
the question of who will use the resources most efficiently, such 
gains are, beyond the superficial level, uncertain.65  Queues are a rec-
ognizable medium for social integration,66 and an incubator for de-
veloping important virtues such as patience, rule-compliance, and 
trust.67  And if civility means regarding others, “including one’s ad-
versaries, as members of the same inclusive collectivity,”68 queues 
 
(suggesting how this reward would resemble not desert but entitlement:  that “those who, 
with the prospect of improving their condition, have done what the system announces it will 
reward are entitled to have their expectations met.  In this sense the more fortunate have title 
to their better situation”). 
 63. MORAN, supra note 40, at 70–71 (describing the decline in civility in queueing, and 
attributing this to an increasingly “accelerated, time poor society” and to the difference 
between queueing for recreational and non-recreational goods and services); see also Ryan 
Powell & John Flint, (In)formalization and the Civilizing Process:  Applying the Work of 
Norbert Elias to Housing-Based Anti-Social Behaviour Interventions in the UK, 26 
HOUSING, THEORY & SOC. 159, 171, 173 (2009) (suggesting that the state-run Respect 
Action Plan in the U.K., which seeks to tackle queue jumping and other “incivilities,” also 
creates a concomitant “decivilizing of previous standards of social regulation”). 
 64. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 34, at 1630 (discussing Richard A. Epstein, Past and 
Future:  The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 670 
(1986)); see also Yoram Barzel, A Theory of Rationing by Waiting, 17 J.L. & ECON. 73 
(1074).  For the important role played by administrative costs in questions of enforcement, 
see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991) (failing to mention queues in this classic study of boundary settings and informal 
norms); compare with the recent analysis in Fagundes, supra note 48 (seeking to re-center 
queues in law and social norms analysis). 
 65. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 34, at 1636 (noting complications); see also infra Part 
III.A.1. 
 66. Again, much depends on the purpose of the queue.  E.g., SOROKIN, supra note 49; 
Nadine Beckmann & Janet Bujra, The ‘Politics of the Queue’:  The Politicization of People 
Living with HIV/AIDS in Tanzania, 41 DEV. & CHANGE 1041 (2010); Gordimer, supra note 
51. 
 67. See, for example, the values imputed to queues in Barr, supra note 52; Ssali, supra 
note 45.  For a useful presentation of Wittgenstein’s challenge to the certainty of rule-
following or rule-breaking, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:  A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 64–68 
(1991). 
 68. Edward Shils, The Virtue of Civil Society, in THE CIVIL SOCIETY READER 291, 298 
(Virginia A. Hodgkinson & Michael W. Foley eds., 2003). 
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can, in principle, provide a useful forum for learning and practicing 
it, and building norms of courtesy, cooperation, and institutional ef-
fectiveness.69 
Much of these justifications for queues are dependent on the 
type of queue.  These include tangible physical queues (for instance, 
in supermarkets, airports, passport controls, and sports and enter-
tainment ticket booths) and legally enforced but virtual queues (mass 
tort compensation funds, public housing applications, or surgery wait 
lists).  The first type usually involves the suspension of other activi-
ties for minutes or hours; while the second involves days, weeks, or 
years in waiting and the continuation of other activities despite sig-
nificant queueing costs.70  The queue, therefore, stands in as a system 
of physical or virtual ordering which gives priority to the timing of 
the claim, despite critical differences in the experiences of time in 
each case.  Moreover, while developments in information technology 
increasingly limit the need for physical queues, such that grocery 
shopping and parking permit applications can now take place online, 
new versions of priority setting in virtual environments themselves 
rely on design principles with certain controlled, if more fleeting, 
queues.71  At the same time, other countervailing modern trends, such 
as urbanization or mobility, have made physical queues ever more 
ubiquitous.72 
 
 69. For an analysis of the “episodic, single stranded, and anonymous” networks that 
may form from queues, and the very different social capital built into the “repeated, 
intensive, multistranded networks” of associations, see ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING 
ALONE:  THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22 (2000). 
 70. In a study of prolonged waiting, one geographer distinguished between the 
different states of “surplus time,” “heightened suspense,” “lost time,” and “panic and 
inertia.”  Craig Jeffrey, Guest Editorial, Waiting, 26 ENV’T & PLAN. D:  SOC’Y & SPACE 954, 
955 (2008).  I discuss further the stakes of rights and queues in Part III.C. 
 71. See, e.g., Perry & Zarsky, supra note 34, at 1637–40 (framing aspects of the 
internet’s network neutrality debate as involving queues); see also TIM WU, THE MASTER 
SWITCH:  THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 285–86 (2010) (describing the risk of 
cable companies providing “fast lane” information pathways for some, and slow lanes for 
others, and suggesting that network neutrality principle can avert this risk).  For an example 
of the high stakes involved, even by a millisecond, in virtual queues, see MICHAEL LEWIS, 
FLASH BOYS:  A WALL STREET REVOLT (2015) (describing the efforts by some high-speed 
traders to move ahead of others, resulting in massive financial gains).  While participants are 
not visible to one another in such virtual environments, the changes to queueing order can 
often be detected, at least in the aggregate if not in individual cases. 
 72. E.g., Johnson, supra note 50.  For an assessment of the contradictions that flow 
from “time and space compression” in modern times, see William E. Scheuerman, Liberal 
Democracy and the Empire of Speed, 34 POLITY 41 (2001).  For attention to what is now 
analyzed as a “politics of waiting,” particularly as experienced in the Global South, see 
Jeffrey, supra note 70, at 957.  See generally JAVIER AUYERO, PATIENTS OF THE STATE:  THE 
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If time is the most vital criteria for allocations in queues, it 
has an uncertain value.  Time is a scarce good, and the reward for the 
investment of time and the recognition of the cost of time would ap-
pear to be the key feature of queues as opposed to other ordering 
mechanisms.  However, in the virtual and physical instantiations of 
queues described above,73 the expenditure of time operates different-
ly.  Moreover, the recognition of the importance of time does not, in 
itself, consider that the benefits of time expenditure can be radically 
different.  In simple distribution queues, people may be queueing to 
receive the same good before others.74  But queues may also deter-
mine the quality of the good, service, or opportunity, its price at point 
of provision, or indeed whether it is received at all.  In the latter 
sense, scholars Ronen Perry and Tal Zarsky have described certain 
queues as “entitlement determining,”75 where those first in line will 
acquire a scarce resource and others will not receive any share.  The 
expenditure of time is therefore unequally rewarded in such queueing 
systems, with very different implications for rights. 
In their relative simplicity, queues thus embody complex sys-
tems of norms and values, and their violation usually gives rise to in-
tense objection.  Especially when combined with other distributive 
criteria, such as desert or need, the queue may represent a fair system 
of allocation whose breach suggests not only a discrete unit of un-
fairness in allocation, but the jeopardy of the more collective values 
described above.  What participants and outsiders consider an im-
permissible breach of the queue is often labeled “queue jumping.”  
Before analyzing the political use of the metaphor of “queue jump-
ing,” the next section introduces the relation between the two con-
cepts. 
C. The Relation Between Rights and Queues 
Once we have posited the existence of the queue as a legal 
category, we can map the relations between rights and queues.  The 
 
POLITICS OF WAITING IN ARGENTINA (2012); CRAIG JEFFREY, TIMEPASS:  YOUTH, CLASS, AND 
THE POLITICS OF WAITING IN INDIA (2010). 
 73. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 74. For example, the Pacific Telegraph Act of 1860 facilitated communication by 
transmitting in order of reception, “excepting that the dispatches of the government shall 
have priority.”  Pacific Telegraph Act, ch. 137, § 3, 12 Stat. 41, 42 (1860)  Thus the queue 
determined the order in which one’s claim was processed, rather than the quality of service 
or whether one got it at all. 
 75. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 34, at 1601 (referring to first in time, first in right rules 
in property law as “winner takes all,” entitlement-determining queues). 
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two concepts forge an ambivalent, interdependent relation.  In order 
to be realized, rights may in some cases prohibit queues, but in other 
cases permit, or even require, them.  Queues, in turn, create, institute, 
and even displace rights.  It is in the distributive context that the rela-
tionship between queues and rights is at its most complex.  The im-
age of the queue seems an intuitive response to the “line-item” mode 
of rights argument that is created by the discrete claims of economic 
and social rights, rather than broader justice-based claims.76  But the 
relation can be both rivalrous and symbiotic:  rights are invoked as a 
means to challenge queues, but rights also rely on queues to be real-
ized.  This contradictory relationship––which raises the inevitable 
tensions between substance and process, informality and formality, 
and negative and positive duties––conceals important questions of 
justice and reason in modern rights claims. 
From the perspective of rights, the use of queues points im-
mediately to the distinction between so-called positive and negative 
rights described above:  negative rights are subject to a duty of im-
mediate respect; positive rights, in their turn, are subject to a duty to 
realize rights progressively, over time.77  Thus, so-called positive 
rights seem not only to permit, but also to require, a waiting priority 
system.  Yet commentators have long noted the “positive” obliga-
tions underlying the so-called “negative” civil and political (and 
property) rights, in the sense that they all require an extensive state 
apparatus to enforce.78  This insight is an important one, although it is 
clear that the act/omission distinction, usually conjured by the posi-
tive/negative distinction, is nevertheless worth retaining in under-
standing the duty of the state to respect fundamental rights.79  The 
analytical sorting of state duties––to respect, protect, and fulfill––has 
helped to clarify this dichotomy.80  Yet again, as we will see, the 
 
 76. Jeremy Waldron has urged a “bigger picture” approach, rather than what he calls a 
“line-item” approach.  See Jeremy Waldron, Socioeconomic Rights and Theories of Justice, 
48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 773, 778 (2011). 
 77. ICESCR, supra note 9, art. 2(1); cf. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 2(1). 
 78. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, ch. 1 (“All Rights Are Positive.”); SHUE, 
supra note 14, at 53 (“The very most ‘negative’-seeming right to liberty, for example, 
requires positive action by society to protect it and positive action by society to restore it 
when avoidance and protection both fail.”). 
 79. FABRE, supra note 14, at 47–49.  The action/omission distinction can also be 
supplemented with distinctions between doing and allowing.  Adam Omar Hosein, Doing, 
Allowing, and the State, 33 L. & PHIL. 235 (2014). 
 80. E.g., SHUE, supra note 14, at 52.  The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) adopted this formula, although the obligation to fulfill is further 
delineated to include obligations to facilitate and provide (the right to food), U.N. Comm. on 
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12:  The Right to Adequate Food 
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concept of the queue confounds the clarity of this typology as well. 
Taking first the duty to respect rights, this obligation is per-
ceived as negative, since it requires the state to refrain from a particu-
lar action that will deprive persons of their rights, and is usually 
termed an immediate one,81 such that any queueing system would be 
prohibited.  A framework of queues for determining freedom from 
torture, or the exercise of free speech, would seem absurd.  To allow 
any reason (administrative or otherwise) to justify delay in respecting 
rights goes against the fundamental structure of the rights argument:  
to “trump” arguments that rely on the common good, or, at the very 
least, heighten the justification required for rights infringements.82  
One can imagine, however, secondary queues in such contexts, such 
as a requirement of reasonable waiting time to secure a prosecution 
for torture, behind other claims; or a reasonable waiting procedure 
for accessing particular city permissions for staging a political 
demonstration.83  As soon as scarce resources are implicated, some 
kind of subordinate priority-setting is required.  Queues may there-
fore be present in our understanding of the duty to respect rights, for 
civil and political rights, no less for economic and social rights.  Take 
one example in support of a duty to respect economic and social 
rights:  a State must refrain from “denying or limiting equal access 
for all persons, including prisoners or detainees, minorities, asylum 
seekers and illegal immigrants, to preventive, curative and palliative 
 
(Art. 11), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, ¶ 15 (May 12, 1999), and the obligation to promote (the 
right to health), U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14:  
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4, 
¶¶ 33, 62 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14].  See further the inclusion 
of this typology in obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the constitutional rights of the 
South African Constitution.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 7–8.  Shue had suggested the duties to 
(1) avoid depriving, (2) protect from deprivation, and (3) aid the deprived.  SHUE, supra note 
14, at 52; see also Asbjørn Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:  A TEXTBOOK 9, 23–24 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 
2d rev. ed. 2001) (presenting typology of duties to respect, protect, and fulfill).  More 
specific, institutionally-oriented duties, such as the duty to “[c]reate [i]nstitutional 
[m]achinery [e]ssential to [the] [r]ealization of [r]ights” and the duty to “provide goods and 
services to satisfy rights,” have also been suggested.  ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 19, at 
183–85. 
 81. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 2(1). 
 82. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 6, with Kumm, supra note 7. 
 83. The design and enforcement of such queues could also be understood as an 
instantiation of the duty to “protect” rather than “respect” rights, demonstrating how this 
distinction, like the distinction between duties to avoid and duties to protect, although 
“relatively clear in the abstract, blurs considerably in concrete reality.”  SHUE, supra note 14, 
at 59. 
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health services” if it is to respect the right to health.84  This prohibi-
tion relies on the fundamental norm of non-discrimination, as well as 
the fundamental importance of the particular right.85  Yet the institu-
tion of some sort of queue for such systems would appear unremark-
able, as long as it did not operate in conjunction with impermissible 
classifications.86 
Secondly, the duty to protect rights is often understood as an 
obligation concerning third parties.87  In this sense, it requires the 
state to ensure that third parties do not deprive people of the guaran-
teed right, through enforcing rights-protective private laws, for ex-
ample,88 or agency decision-making.89  The duty is critical for rights 
in market-based societies.90  Again, a relatively uncontroversial ex-
ample would be a duty on the state to regulate hazardous chemicals 
that are a risk to public health:  the duty would require the govern-
ment to pass and enforce laws that prohibit private companies from 
releasing such chemicals.91  Yet again, queues may be permissible to 
 
 84. See General Comment No. 14, supra note 80, ¶ 34; see also JOHN TOBIN, THE 
RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 167–68 (2012). 
 85. General Comment No. 14, supra note 80, ¶ 34; see also id. ¶ 50; U.N. Comm. on 
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20:  Non-discrimination in 
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009). 
 86. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 282–83. 
 87. SHUE, supra note 14, at 55–56.  Shue draws his typology from basic moral rights, 
including those that “ought to, but do not yet, have legal protection.”  Id. at 15, 28 (citing 
JAMES C. SCOTT, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT:  REBELLION AND SUBSISTENCE IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 40–41 (1976)).  For a presentation of the early conceptual work outlining 
the government’s power to regulate the market, and hence discharge a duty to protect—
albeit through the prism of maximizing collective welfare rather than individual rights as 
understood at that time—see BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ 
FAIRE:  ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998). 
 88. This duty is described in comparative constitutional settings as one of “horizontal 
effect,” or Drittwirkung.  See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of 
Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387 (2003); Oliver Gerstenberg, What 
Constitutions Can Do (but Courts Sometimes Don’t):  Property, Speech, and the Influence of 
Constitutional Norms on Private Law, 17 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 61 (2004). 
 89. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”:  When Agencies 
Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157 (2014). 
 90. See, for example, the human rights framework of John Ruggie, Special 
Representative of the Sec’y-Gen. on the Issue of Human Rights & Transnational Corps. & 
Other Bus. Enters., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:  Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (June 
16, 2011) (emphasizing, as the first of three pillars in the framework, “the State duty to 
protect”). 
 91. See, e.g., General Comment No. 14, supra note 80, ¶ 51 (noting the example of a 
violation of the State’s obligation to protect the right to health, by, inter alia, “the failure to 
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establish agency priorities within certain timelines,92 or to sort out 
compensation claims, in the event that third parties infringe such 
laws in the face of illegality.93  They are therefore present in the duty 
to protect rights. 
Finally, the duty to fulfill is understood as a positive obliga-
tion.  It requires the state to establish political, economic, and social 
systems that provide access to the good, service, or opportunity at is-
sue in the guaranteed right for all members of society.94  For exam-
ple, a government must provide essential health services such as ac-
cessible primary care and clean water.95  Again, queues may be 
permitted and also required in such arrangements, especially if the 
government is to establish such systems without using market mech-
anisms.96  Queues provide such rights a tangible presence in the 
world:  the right to food, for example, may require a delivery system 
of queueing in order to be realized, particularly in conditions of ex-
treme scarcity (of course, the more usual mechanism of the market is 
far more relevant to the long-term realization of the right to food, as 
will be seen below).97  While an inordinately long queue for essential 
services would suggest an infringement of the duty to fulfill such 
rights,98 there is nothing in the structure of the queue itself that is ob-
 
enact or enforce laws to prevent the pollution of water, air and soil by extractive and 
manufacturing industries”).  For broader connections between public health programs and 
the international right to health, see TOBIN, supra note 84, at 34–41. 
 92. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 89, at 162 (suggesting constraints on agencies’ 
deferral of decisions, including the proviso that “resource allocation is an entirely legitimate 
grounds for moving particular agency action to the end of the queue, but . . . may not be 
invoked repeatedly to keep a particular action at the back of the queue forever”). 
 93. Schuck, supra note 36. 
 94. ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 19, at 184–85 (suggesting, in respect of a duty to 
provide goods and services, that the state’s resources “may go directly from it to the 
individual rights-bearer, as by providing food stamps or subsidized public housing, or it may 
go indirectly to the ultimate beneficiary through, say, subsidies to construction firms that 
will then offer low-rent housing”).  See also SHUE, supra note 14, at 56–57 (noting various 
duties that would fall under a duty to aid). 
 95. General Comment No. 14, supra note 80, ¶ 36; EIDE, supra note 80; see also 
Patrick Bond & Jackie Dugard, The Case of Johannesburg Water:  What Really Happened 
at the Pre-Paid ‘Parish Pump’, L. DEMOCRACY & DEV., Jan. 2008, at 1. 
 96. E.g., Aoife Nolan, Budget Analysis and Economic and Social Rights, in ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND 
CHALLENGES 369, 369–90 (Eibe Riedel et al. eds., 2014). 
 97. See generally infra Part III.B.  Market design has many features, but it is worth 
noting that queue management has become an integral part of customer service in market-
governed systems, with mathematical, engineering, and architectural literature on queue 
management blossoming since the 1950s.  GROSS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 98. A timely example is represented by the ubiquity of queues in Venezuela’s current 
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jectionable. 
Thus it would appear, in the face of an incongruity between 
rights and queues, that the two do share an interdependent relation, 
and that even the duty to immediately respect rights carries with it an 
understanding that enforcement might have to depend on particular 
priority setting.  Much here depends on baselines.  It is therefore nec-
essary to examine whether there is anything in the design of queues 
that invokes a particular relation with rights.  For as well as institut-
ing the realization of rights, queues themselves may also be observed 
to both create and displace rights.  To understand how this is so, one 
must observe the ancillary rights that queues appear to create. 
While a full analysis of such ancillary rights is beyond the 
scope of the present Article, I present a basic sketch here in order to 
lay the framework for understanding the rhetorical use of queues in 
arguing for and against the rights claimed in the illustrations in Part 
II.  The ancillary rights are property-like, although the analogy is a 
loose one.  In broad terms, we can point to the earlier analysis by 
Charles Reich, who pointed to a form of “new property,”99 at work in 
the modern administrative state.  With this analytical tool, Reich 
showed how government largess could be understood to create new 
forms of wealth, upon which, he argued, beneficiaries should be able 
to form some sort of reliance.  In this vein, we might say that the 
modern human rights-respecting State creates queues, setting out ex-
pectations of benefit even before distribution.  Reich’s analysis was 
directed to the rights or statuses that the government had already pro-
vided, which, he argued, should be subject to procedural safeguards 
before removal.100  We might say that queues––or a person’s place in 
 
energy, food, and medicine crisis.  Venezuela’s Crisis:  Implications for the Region:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of the H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, 
114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Rep. Jeff Duncan, Chairman, Subcomm. on the W. 
Hemisphere) (“Food shortages affect 80 percent of the population, which wait an average of 
4 hours in line to obtain basic foodstuffs.  Nine out of ten homes do not eat three meals a 
day.  This situation has led to more than 50 food riots and deaths of at least five people.”). 
 99. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).  Reich preferred 
the term “public interest state” but predicted a welfare state was emerging in the United 
States.  Id. at 756–71. 
 100. This re-framing of a “new property” led to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), 
and the procedural protections for welfare recipients, including entitlement to a hearing.  
Major retrenchments since then have occurred, both through statute and caselaw.  For 
statutory changes, see Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.), and others discussed in JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME 
WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 192–96, 235–37 (2007); FELICIA KORNBLUH, 
THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS:  POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 176 
(2007).  For judicial revisions, see Vicki Lens, Confronting Government After Welfare 
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them––are rights-realization-in-waiting, where the allocative priority 
that a person is given within a waiting system gives rise to a legiti-
mate expectation that she or he can rely on this method of allocation. 
Yet this creation of an ancillary right—to promote the realiza-
tion of the primary right (such as in housing, health care, or the secu-
rity of the person from persecution, each detailed in Part II below)—
cuts both ways.  Indeed, it may create a conflict between rights and 
queues.  Queuers and others police the distributive channel and de-
ride “queue jumpers” if they access such goods or services before 
them.  Due, in no small part, to such well-observed phenomena as the 
“endowment effect,”—whereby “the sheer fact of possession” con-
fers a sense of entitlement—and related theories of loss aversion,101 
those waiting in line react strongly against those who apparently 
evade it.  Of course, queues can be designed to operate with certain 
other distributive criteria, which exempt certain interests from the 
temporal discipline, or even absorb evaders to preserve the order of 
the line.102  Yet it is the pernicious relation between ancillary rights-
realization-in-waiting and rights that sets out the condition in which 
the former displaces the latter, or, at least, in which such displace-
ment is claimed to be justified.  This is the basic structure of what I 
identify as “queue talk.” 
II. RIGHTS TALK VERSUS QUEUE TALK? THREE EXAMPLES 
A conceptual and functional analysis of rights and queues is 
properly informed by evidence of each concept’s rhetorical use.  Or-
dinary language use of such concepts, and accompanying prevalent 
behavior, are relevant to their conceptual classifications and legal 
functions:  people’s beliefs about justice, and people’s behavior when 
asked to allocate some valuable resource, inform politics and law.  In 
this way, “rights talk” and “queue talk” are constitutive of principles 
 
Reform:  Moralists, Reformers, and Narratives of (Ir)responsibility at Administrative Fair 
Hearings, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 563, 573 (2009) (noting, as well as other procedural hurdles, 
the arbitrary waiting lists that accompany such hearings); see also Jason Parkin, Adaptable 
Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (2012). 
 101. Gray, supra note 34, at 179–80; see also Alex Coram & Lyle Noakes, Relative 
Advantage, Queue Jumping, and Welfare Maximizing Wealth Distribution 2 (U. Mass. 
Amherst Econ. Dep’t Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2006-08, 2006), http:// 
scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=econ_workingpaper 
(“In other words if not being able to move up in the queue is bad, having someone push in 
front may be even worse.”). 
 102. Gray, supra note 34, at 187–88. 
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and practices of justice.103  “Rights talk” has long been analyzed as a 
discursive trope in which the appeal to rights (and often, the appeal to 
litigation)104 sets the domain of political argument, in both limiting 
and expansive ways.105  In this Part, I suggest “queue talk” operates 
as a countervailing and complementary discursive trope, which in-
vokes the concept of the queue and objection to its evasion.106 
In the three examples of “queue talk” described in this Part, 
participants invoke the spatial ordering scheme of persons-in-waiting 
as the appropriate method of allocating scarce resources in housing, 
health care, and asylum claims, and use the pejorative term of “queue 
jumping” to describe those who proceed outside this order, including 
by claims of right.  This is done, by and large, with the queue acting 
as a metaphor for distribution. 
A metaphor stands in the place of words and engenders many 
narratives, some of them conflicting.  But for a metaphor to “stick,” 
as a trope of socio-political discourse, it must enjoy immediate intui-
 
 103. For a description of constitutive processes, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF 
JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); YOUNG, supra note 14.  On the 
constitutive role of what is termed “rights consciousness,” see MICHAEL W. MCCANN, 
RIGHTS AT WORK:  PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994) 
(conceptualizing how rights “work” as cultural conventions in social practice). 
 104. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE (1991). 
 105. Waldron, supra note 4.  For a discussion of the “myth of rights” literature, see 
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:  LAYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE (2d ed. 2004); Alan Hunt, Rights and Social Movements:  Counter-Hegemonic 
Strategies, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y 309 (1990).  Of course, international human rights talk has 
distinct features, which have propelled a rich theoretical and empirical agenda in 
understanding how this body of law compels change.  See RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, 
SOCIALIZING STATES:  PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013) 
(detailing processes of material inducement, persuasion, and acculturation as responsible for 
the uptake of international human rights law); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS & 
GENDER VIOLENCE:  TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 219–22 (2006) 
(presenting an anthropology of the processes of “vernacularization” of human rights law); 
KAY SCHAFFER & SIDONIE SMITH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NARRATED LIVES:  THE ETHICS OF 
RECOGNITION (2004) (exploring features of storytelling in human rights advocacy); see also 
KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION:  HOW HEALTH, 
FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013); Adam S. Chilton, The 
Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion:  An Experimental 
Study, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 110 (2014). 
 106. I analyze the particular hold of queue talk against the background of broader social 
science and literary research on metaphor and narrative in Katharine G. Young, Narrative, 
Metaphor and Human Rights Law:  When Rights-Talk Meets Queue-Talk, in NARRATIVE 
AND METAPHOR IN LAW (Michael Hanne & Robert Weisberg eds., forthcoming). 
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tive appeal and represent a cognitive reference point for many.107  
The prevalence of these metaphors suggests that queue talk has be-
gun to rival rights talk’s importance in justice claims.  Of course, in 
each case, rights and queues have an institutional ontology, and do 
not just exist solely as “talk.”  As Part I has shown, their institutional 
dimension is not reducible to the way they are talked about, and in-
deed the two are distinct.  In each of the following examples, queue 
talk appears to refer to an actual queue and yet the wait list or line 
may be largely inoperative.108  In this respect, the discourse of queues 
and “queue jumping” may tell us more about the popular understand-
ing of allocative systems, rather than the process of allocation itself. 
The above description of the two concepts in the abstract 
leaves many questions open, as the case studies––of South Africa and 
housing rights contestations, Canada and patient rights contestations, 
and Australia and refugee rights contestations––will show.  In each 
case, I describe the queue, the act of “queue jumping,” the “queue 
jumpers,” and those perceived as harmed by the practice, followed by 
a short overview of the housing, health care, or asylum processing 
system in place.  This exercise shows how queues are understood as 
operating to institute, but also, importantly, to displace, rights. 
The three case studies demonstrate very different uses of the 
same metaphor, with different understandings of the “queue,” how it 
is evaded, and who is harmed by the evasion.  The comparative anal-
ysis helps to shed light on the different values at stake in thinking 
about rights in terms of queueing distributional systems and chal-
lenges to that system.  South Africa, as my primary case study, will 
be the most detailed of the three.  Insofar as this analysis is compara-
tive, it helps to shed light on the different values at stake in thinking 
about rights in terms of queueing distributional systems and chal-
lenges to that system.  The three illustrations are therefore provided 
as examples of a discourse that has formed against the backdrop of 
 
 107. See, e.g., the analysis of successful metaphor in MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD 
L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN THE MODERN STATE:  HOW THE COURTS REFORMED 
AMERICA’S PRISONS 238 (1998).  For a similar “keyword” analysis, see Nancy Fraser & 
Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency:  Tracing a Keyword in the U.S. Welfare State, 
19 SIGNS:  J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 309 (1994). 
 108. Queue talk may be suggestive of either metonym or metaphor––that is, there is 
contiguity between the discourse and what it describes, rather than a mere analogy.  As the 
Oxford English Dictionary defines it, in metaphor, a “descriptive word or phrase is 
transferred to an object or action different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally 
applicable.”  Metaphor, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2001).  In metonymy, “a 
word or phrase denoting an object, action, institution, etc.,” is functionally replaced with “a 
word or phrase denoting a property or something associated with it.”  Metonymy, OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2001). 
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different legal systems, as well as different socio-economic policy 
domains.  This analysis suggests that, alongside the increasing use of 
the rights vocabulary in legal systems across the world, a new moral 
idiom of queue talk has developed that demands our attention. 
Such an inquiry departs from the methodology of comparative 
public law that seeks causal inferences from observed convergences 
and divergences in law.109  Instead, it posits the question as to wheth-
er the observed expanding international currency of rights talk is also 
met, in the same places, with the expansion (or adoption) of queue 
talk, particularly in divisive domestic controversies.  For this reason, 
it is necessary to describe the use of rights, as well as the basic fea-
tures of the legal systems, in which this discourse has appeared. 
South Africa, Canada, and Australia have all inherited the 
English common law system, making them perhaps more conducive 
to queueing ideas in law.110  Yet their legal systems can be distin-
guished on many relevant grounds––the legal recognition accorded to 
human rights being the most pertinent.  South Africa’s post-apartheid 
Constitution recognizes the most expansive list of constitutional 
rights, including justiciable economic and social rights;111 Canada’s 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognizes primarily civil and politi-
cal rights at the constitutional level;112 Australia’s human rights re-
gime is a patchwork of statutory protections,113 with the emphasis on 
 
 109. For a justification of such departure, see Young, supra note 23 (describing the 
importance of the humanities, as well as the social sciences, for the multidisciplinarity of 
comparative public law). 
 110. Gray, supra note 34, at 175–76 (describing the analogies between the queue and 
the doctrine of estates). 
 111. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 8, 9, 26–29. 
 112. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).  Provincial legislation also provides 
rights protections.  See, e.g., Alberta Bill of Rights, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-14 (Can.); Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms of Québec, C.Q.L.R. c. C-12 (Can.); Saskatchewan Bill of 
Rights Act, R.S.S. 1953, c.345 (Can.).  The implications of this tier of rights protection are 
discussed below.  See infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 113. E.g., Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (Austl.); 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (Austl.) (including civil and political rights and the right to 
education).  After a nationwide consultation in 2009, a government-appointed committee 
recommended a federal Human Rights Act for Australia, yet this recommendation was 
rejected in 2010.  See generally Let’s Talk About Rights—Human Rights Act for Australia, 
AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (Apr. 21, 2010), https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-
work/rights-and-freedoms/projects/lets-talk-about-rights-human-rights-act-australia.  The 
Australian Constitution contains limited rights, in express or implied terms, and legislation is 
also limited.  See, e.g., PETER BAILEY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS ENTERPRISE IN AUSTRALIA AND 
INTERNATIONALLY (2009); GEORGE WILLIAMS & DAVID HUME, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE 
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2014). 
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parliamentary scrutiny and administrative procedures rather than ju-
dicial review. 
Together, these systems have been described as “dialogic,” or 
“weak-form,” insofar as the courts and legislatures are understood to 
share a role in enforcing rights.114  While this shared enterprise is 
highly relevant to the influence of the popular discourses studied in 
this Article, the emphasis taken here is on the elements of that dis-
course rather than on institutional differences that may, in part, be a 
cause.   
Similarly, this Article does not foreground the comparative 
differences between the three administrative (welfare or developmen-
tal) states of South Africa, Canada, and Australia.  These involve dif-
ferent levels of public resources (taxable revenue and GDP) as well 
as different income distribution,115 different attitudes towards redis-
tribution, different legal and political cultures, and different social 
and racial cleavages.116  The illustrations of queue talk in such highly 
distinct settings are provided here to demonstrate the frequent associ-
ation of rights talk with queue talk, rather than any causal claims. 
Moreover, in addition to the three countries, the three socio-
economic policy domains offered for comparison––housing, health 
care, and immigration––are highly disparate, insofar as they involve, 
anywhere, differently placed beneficiaries (by class, race, and nation-
ality), differently placed decision-makers (municipalities and bureau-
 
 114. GARDBAUM, supra note 7 (including Australia, along with Canada, New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom, as examples of a so-called “Commonwealth model” of 
constitutionalism, with dialogic features, which depart from U.S. arrangements); TUSHNET, 
supra note 7, at 24 (omitting Australia from a presentation of weak-form review); Rosalind 
Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socio-Economic Rights:  Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form 
Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 391 (2007) (including South Africa).  This 
aspect is relevant to the association of queue-jumping with courts.  See infra Part III.A.3. 
 115. The Gini coefficient, or normalized Gini index, measures the statistical dispersion 
of income distribution between a country’s residents, and, despite methodological 
shortcomings, is the most commonly used measure of inequality.  The World Bank’s Gini 
index estimates Canada as having the lowest inequality of the three countries, at 33.7 (in 
2010), Australia at 34.9 (in 2010), and South Africa at the highest of the three, at 63.4 (in 
2011).  See World Databank:  World Development Indictors, WORLD BANK, http://databank. 
worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SI.POV.GINI&country= (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2016). 
 116. A rich literature explores the relevance of such differences.  For a seminal study, 
see GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990).  See 
also, e.g., Torben Iversen & David Soskice, Electoral Institutions and the Politics of 
Coalitions:  Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others, 100 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 165 (2006) (applying the analytical framework to comparative politics).  For specific 
attention to the influence of international standards in different democracies, see LINOS 
supra note 105. 
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cracies at the housing level; medical associations, professionals, and 
bureaucracies at the health care level; and international organizations 
and bureaucracies at the immigration level); stakeholders (industries, 
beneficiaries, coordinated interest or consumer groups, national or 
transnational advocacy groups, and social movements), and different 
statutory and administrative frameworks.117  What they have in 
common is how contentious each policy domain is in each jurisdic-
tion.  Nonetheless, it is precisely these differences within policy do-
mains that reveal the contingencies of the relationship between rights 
and queues, in ideological and institutional terms. 
A. South Africa and Housing Rights 
“Queue jumping” in South Africa is a discourse centered on 
the allocation system for state-subsidized housing.  In this context, of 
course, the South African Constitution famously guarantees the right 
to have access to housing, which has been deftly upheld by the Con-
stitutional Court.118  The queue is the register of low-income house-
holds in need of housing assistance established in 1994, at the same 
time as the post-apartheid Constitution endorsed a guarantee of the 
right of everyone to “have access to . . . housing.”119  State-
subsidized housing is delivered based on various criteria such as lo-
cation, special needs, age, along with, importantly, time spent on the 
“waiting list.”120  Jumping the queue implies any perversion of the 
waiting list system, such as through “occupying” vacant lots ear-
marked for development or empty houses, and then using anti-
eviction rules and courts to defend that occupation.121  At the same 
 
 117. For the relevance of such institutional differences, see illustrative references infra 
Part III.B. 
 118. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 26; Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) 
SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.); see infra notes 125–36 and accompanying text. 
 119. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 26; Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (S. Afr.) (setting out the standards that must be met 
before evictions can occur); Housing Act 107 of 1997 (S. Afr.) (setting out the 
responsibilities of the national, provincial, and municipal governments in housing delivery). 
 120. KATE TISSINGTON ET AL., ‘JUMPING THE QUEUE’, WAITING LISTS AND OTHER 
MYTHS: PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICE AROUND HOUSING:  DEMAND AND ALLOCATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 7 (2013) (providing a thorough study of the perceptions and realities of 
housing provision). 
 121. For an analysis of the evolving status of these protections, see, for example, 
LIEBENBERG, supra note 30; Stuart Wilson & Jackie Dugard, Taking Poverty Seriously:  The 
South African Constitutional Court and Socio-Economic Rights, in LAW AND POVERTY:  
PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND BEYOND 222 (Sandra Liebenberg & Geo Quinot 
eds., 2012); see also Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v. Modderklip 
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time, there is also a perception that “people can pay and jump to the 
front of the queue,”122 so the practice is two-fold; both practices are 
criticized, yet it is only the former that describes the practice of those 
claiming rights. 
“Queue jumpers” themselves are understood to be those resi-
dent in informal settlements who are often new to the area in which 
they are “squatting” and who frequently arrive from rural areas in 
which much dislocation has occurred, or from outside South Afri-
ca.123  The protagonists are therefore poor, desperate, and often dis-
placed, who claim their rights to housing, but are perceived as sub-
verting the waiting list at the expense of other poor, desperate, but 
patient, applicants, who themselves face very limited options for 
shelter.124  Under the “queue jumping” narrative, the resulting harm 
falls on those waiting for housing allocation or support (recorded as 
some 1.8 million households),125 as well as the general public, from 
the social unrest that comes as a result, and from perceptions of cor-
ruption and patronage.  The discourse of “queue jumping” is de-
ployed in the South African media, and by officials and politicians in 
relation to housing policy.126  It is worth noting that, while the con-
 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) para. 23 (S. Afr.). 
 122. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 72; Lauren Royston & Ronald Eglin, 
Allocation Thought Piece for Managed Land Settlement 11 (Dec. 5, 2011) (unpublished 
draft), http://www.incrementalsettlement.org.za/files/uploads/files/1323332855-allocation-
thought-piece-for-managed-land-settlement.pdf (suggesting “people don’t believe in waiting 
lists as the allocation mechanism in practice—views are widely held that they are corrupt 
and that people can pay and jump to the front of the queue”). 
 123. HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL, CITIZENSHIP, VIOLENCE AND XENOPHOBIA IN 
SOUTH AFRICA:  PERCEPTIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITIES (2008) (noting the 
perception that non-South African citizens are occupying national housing stock, which has 
been a trigger of xenophobic violence); TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 71. 
 124. Sophie Oldfield & Saskia Greyling, Waiting for the State:  A Politics of Housing in 
South Africa, 47 ENV’T & PLANNING A 1100, 1102 (2015) (describing the precarious 
modalities of waiting, which include:  “living in overcrowded conditions with family 
members in rented accommodation; living in a backyard shack of a rented house, paying a 
rental fee for a space to erect a shack and sharing bathroom facilities with the household—
sometimes family, other times a landlord; and erecting shelter in an informal settlement, 
which may or may not be legal with some services and infrastructure in place”). 
 125. Of this national figure, estimates suggest that around 25% live in shacks in 
informal settlements, 45% live in a dwelling or other structure on a separate stand, 12% live 
in a traditional dwelling, and 10% live in a backyard shack.  THE HOUS. DEV’T AGENCY, 
SOUTH AFRICA:  INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS STATUS 47 (2012); TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 
120, at 27. 
 126. See, e.g., Radical Plans to Change the Face of Housing Delivery,  S. AFR. GOV’T 
NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/radical-plans-
change-face-housing-delivery (noting, as official policy, the encouragement of “human 
yuiosdfsd  
2016] RIGHTS AND QUEUES 95 
demnation of the practice is widespread, the connotations of land in-
vasion and squatting may be different among and across South Afri-
ca’s racial and social groupings.127  The government itself, while of-
ten deviating from housing wait lists on the basis of need (and in 
accordance with constitutional rights), as well as other criteria, has 
been slow to announce such changes, perhaps, as suggested by one 
commentator, in “fear that people will torch their shacks and back-
yard shanties to jump the queue.”128 
The discourse has moved explicitly from politics to law. In 
several constitutional complaints, the government has defended its 
eviction practices by alleging “queue jumping” on the part of the 
evictees.129  The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself has 
adopted the metaphor, noting that “[o]pportunists should not be ena-
bled to gain preference over those who have been waiting for hous-
ing, patiently, according to legally prescribed procedures . . . [t]hey 
have to wait in the queue or join it.”130  Nonetheless, the Constitu-
 
settlements in terms of a demand led approach . . . [which] must be viewed and managed 
constructively so that is not seen as a means of queue jumping”). 
 127. JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES:  LAND RECONCILIATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 77 (2009).  Gibson’s research and surveys, which generated controversy in 
South Africa, are suggestive of a different perception of the practices of “queue jumping” by 
race and class—and that white South Africans see it as a rule of law issue, while others do 
not.  Gibson’s findings have been endorsed by other commentators.  E.g., Theunis Roux, 
Book Review, 45 TULSA L. REV. 781, 788 (noting that “[s]upport for Zimbabwe style land 
reform in South Africa [at two thirds], it turns out, does not mean that black South Africans 
attach no value to the rule of law, but that support for other values—notably rectifying past 
injustices—trumps support for the rule of law, at least in relation to land reform”). 
 128. Rowan Philp & Nashira Davids, Jumping the Housing Queue, AFR. NEWS SERV., 
May 9, 2005. 
 129. See, e.g., City of Johannesburg Metro. Municipality v. Blue Moonlight Props. 39 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) (S. Afr.); City of Johannesburg Metro. Municipality v. Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty.) Ltd. 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) (S. Afr.); see also Gov’t of the 
Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para. 60; Modderfontein Squatters, 
Greater Benoni City Council v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) 
paras. 23–25 (rejecting state’s submission that “queue jumping” at issue, finding “no 
evidence that the occupation took place with the intent to obtain precedence . . . [but rather] 
because the people had nowhere else to go and because they believed that the land, which to 
them did not appear to have been cultivated, belonged to the municipality”); confirmed in 
President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) 
paras. 32–34; Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para. 
3, 55 (rejecting state’s submission of queue jumping because “occupiers . . . are a 
community who are homeless, who have been evicted once, and who found land to occupy 
with what they considered to be the permission of the owner where they have been residing 
for eight years”). 
 130. Blue Moonlight Props. 39. (Pty) Ltd, 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) para. 93 (S. Afr.) (Van 
Der Westhuizen, J.). 
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tional Court has been reluctant to characterize rights claimants as 
“queue jumpers,” arguing that those seeking temporary or emergency 
housing can be distinguished from those seeking “permanent hous-
ing, ahead of anyone else in a queue.”131  Similarly, a homeless 
community, “who ha[s] been evicted once, and who found land to 
occupy with what they considered to be the permission of the owner 
where they have been residing for . . . a considerable period of time” 
are not “queue jumpers,” according to the Court.132  Not surprisingly, 
the same factors that are relevant to the grant or refusal of an eviction 
order are relevant to whether occupiers are described as “queue 
jumpers” or not.  These factors include the circumstances under 
which the unlawful occupiers started occupying and erecting their il-
legal structures on the property, the period the unlawful occupiers 
have resided on the land in question, the availability of alternative 
accommodation of land, and the rights and needs of the elderly, chil-
dren, persons with disabilities, and female-headed households.133  
The Court will also examine whether occupation has occurred on 
public or private land (as a relevant, although not decisive factor),134 
the degree of the housing emergency faced by the unlawful occupi-
ers, and whether they have a plausible belief in the permissibility of 
their occupation or have instead “deliberately invade[d] land with a 
view to disrupting the organised housing programme and placing 
themselves at the front of the queue.”135 
These uses of queue talk must be understood against the 
background of South Africa’s housing policies. The allocation of 
housing has been integral to post-apartheid South Africa and its goal 
of providing redress for the historical, socio-economic, and racial in-
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para. 55 
(S. Afr.) (Sachs, J.). 
 133. Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998 §§ 4, 6 (S. Afr.).  For commentary, see Gustav Muller & Sandra Liebenberg, 
Developing the Law of Joinder in the Context of Evictions of People from their Homes, 29 S. 
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 554, 565 (2013). 
 134. Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para. 26 
(S. Afr.) (Sachs, J.) (noting that different considerations weigh in relation to the occupation 
of public or private land and that “private land may be derelict, with the owners having little 
practical interest in its utilisation, while public land may have been set aside for important 
public purposes, including the provision of housing”); see also City of Johannesburg Metro. 
Municipality v. Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) (S. Afr.) 
(noting that occupation on private land nevertheless raises obligations on the local 
municipality). 
 135. Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para. 26 
(S. Afr.) (Sachs, J.). 
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justices of apartheid.136  Registering one’s name for a house is per-
ceived as a “rite of passage.”137  One commentator describes the 
“eradication of the housing backlog” as both a political target and a 
broader developmental goal.138  The 1994 White Paper on Housing 
committed the government to provide housing for all its citizens,139 
mainly through the construction of new houses on greenfield, previ-
ously undeveloped land.140  This scheme has, according to govern-
ment reports, resulted in the construction of “an additional 5,6 mil-
lion formal homes since the country’s first democratic elections.”141  
Who gets a house, where, and when, is thus a central terrain of South 
African politics. 
The queue––understood as the housing register––has been 
pivotal in these contestations.  While the goal of housing provision 
became a central purpose of the African National Congress in post-
apartheid South Africa, many of the housing lists on which the new 
government relied had already been drawn up during apartheid.142  In 
merging these lists and creating new databases,143 housing claimants 
 
 136. Lucy A. Williams, The Right to Housing in South Africa:  An Evolving 
Jurisprudence, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 816, 819–20 (2014). 
 137. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 58–59 (discovering from discussions with 
Gauteng NGO that registering one’s name was “a rite of passage for people when they turn 
18,” with “no sense of how long they will wait . . . or what options are available to them” 
during this time); see also Oldfield & Greyling, supra note 124, at 1107 (noting that, based 
on “sustained and repeated promises from the state, putting yourself on the housing list 
remains the most likely route to obtain a formal house”). 
 138. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120; Marie Huchzermeyer, Pounding at the Tip of 
the Iceberg:  The Dominant Politics of Informal Settlement Eradication in South Africa, 37 
POLITIKON 129 (2010). 
 139. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., DEP’T OF HOUS., A NEW HOUSING POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR 
SOUTH AFRICA (1994), http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/16178_0.pdf. 
 140. A major shift to this initial Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 
1994 was the Breaking New Ground (BNG) plan in 2004.  REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., DEP’T OF 
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, “BREAKING NEW GROUND”:  A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR THE 
CREATION OF SUSTAINABLE HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (2004), http://www.dhs.gov.za/sites/ 
default/files/documents/26082014_BNG2004.pdf. 
 141. South Africa Yearbook 2014/15:  Human Settlements, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION & INFORMATION SYSTEM 239, http://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/ 
www.gcis.gov.za/files/docs/resourcecentre/yearbook/Human%20Settlements2015.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2016).  While the government has reported these figures, they are disputed, 
with less than 1.44 million state-subsidized properties registered since 1994.  See 
TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 23. 
 142. See TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 25. 
 143. The post-apartheid lists are complicated by their apartheid-era roots.  For example, 
Oldfield and Greyling demonstrate how, in Cape Town, individuals formerly classified as 
“coloured” (mixed race) were placed on waiting lists in the segregated group areas, but 
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were asked to fill in a form with details such as ID number, gender, 
age, and number of dependents, and were given a receipt with the 
date on which they had registered.144  The expectation was that this 
list would work on a “first come, first served” basis, and applicants 
would receive a house when their name made its way to the top.145  
Later, other factors were deemed relevant, such as location and 
“catchment” for an intended housing project, or an applicant’s in-
come.146  Some municipalities also created random selection or “lot-
tery” systems, and discrete application processes for advertised, pro-
ject-based opportunities.147  Since 2008, public guidelines have been 
drawn up “to facilitate fair, equitable, transparent and inclusive selec-
tion and housing subsidy application approval processes” for certain 
housing applications, although their practical effect has been un-
clear.148  Nonetheless, the waiting list has continued to be a key 
mechanism in housing allocations and a key focus in political contes-
tations. 
Into the mix of this legislative and administrative regime has 
come litigation and, as a result, judicial oversight, of the housing 
programs.  Indeed, housing rights claims have vastly outnumbered 
any of the other economic and social rights as a source of constitu-
tional complaint.149  In an early and very well-known case, the Con-
stitutional Court in Grootboom held that the government had in-
fringed the right to housing by failing to cater to vulnerable people in 
desperate need of housing, including the claimant, Irene Grootboom, 
and her community.150  The government had pointed to the problem 
 
families classified as “African” (the majority) were excluded from access.  This meant the 
place on the list reflected different dates of insertion.  Oldfield & Greyling, supra note 124, 
at 1106. 
 144. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 25. 
 145. Id.; Oldfield & Greyling, supra note 124, at 1106–07. 
 146. Oldfield & Greyling, supra note 124, at 1107.  The catchment refers to the area 
from which people are allocated to particular schools, hospitals, shops, or other services.  
For discussion of these factors, see, for example, Nick Gallent, New Agendas in Planning 
and Rural Housing, in PLANNING, MARKETS AND RURAL HOUSING 1, 1–8 (Nick Gallent ed., 
2012). 
 147. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 26. 
 148. Id. at 33 (referring to the National Department of Housing’s 2008 National 
Housing Allocation Strategy). 
 149. See, e.g., Jackie Dugard, Beyond Blue Moonlight:  The Implications of Judicial 
Avoidance in Relation to the Provision of Alternative Housing, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 265, 267 
(2014); Brian Ray, Evictions, Aspirations and Avoidance, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 173, 173 
(2014). 
 150. Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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of queue jumping, in policy (and later doctrinal) terms.151  The Con-
stitutional Court held that the national housing program had fallen 
short of the constitutional right to housing by failing to: 
provide for relief for those in desperate need.  They 
are not to be ignored in the interests of an overall pro-
gramme focussed on medium and long-term objec-
tives.  It is essential that a reasonable part of the na-
tional housing budget be devoted to this, but the 
precise allocation is for national government to decide 
in the first instance.152 
Despite this finding of a rights infringement, the Constitutional Court 
declined to issue an individual remedy, making only a declaration of 
unconstitutionality that was resolved incrementally by the govern-
ment over time.153  The refusal to issue a more substantive remedy to 
the individual plaintiffs, whose rights were infringed, has been criti-
cized,154 and yet many within South Africa and abroad have ex-
pressed support for the ability of this approach to support long-term, 
government-led (rather than court-led), reform.155 
The Constitutional Court has continued to refuse to issue 
remedies that would reorder the priorities set by government in indi-
vidual allocative terms.  In the intervening decade and a half since 
Grootboom, the Constitutional Court has heard a large number of an-
ti-eviction and other housing rights cases (and lower courts have 
heard an even greater number).156  In making a stronger argument for 
 
 151. Id. para. 61 (policy arguments); see also cases cited supra note 129 (doctrinal 
arguments); discussion infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 152. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 para. 66.  Priority is given to the needs of the poor.  
See Housing Act 107 of 1997 § 2(1)(a) (S. Afr.); Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty. W. Cape v. 
Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) para. 350 (S. Afr.). 
 153. Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).  For a 
review and assessment of the National Housing Code changes, see Malcolm Langford, 
Housing Rights Litigation:  Grootboom and Beyond, in SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA:  SYMBOLS OR SUBSTANCE? 187 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2014). 
 154. Christopher Mbazira, Non-Implementation of Court Orders in Socio-Economic 
Rights Litigation in South Africa:  Is the Cancer Here to Stay?, ESR REV: ECON. & SOC. 
RTS. S. AFR., Nov. 2008 at 2, 3; Marius Pieterse, Coming to Terms with Judicial 
Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 20 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 383, 407 (2004). 
 155. See, e.g., LIEBENBERG, supra note 30; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: 
WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001) (endorsing an “administrative law” approach to 
constitutional rights); Langford, supra note 153; Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable Social Rights 
as a Critique of the Liberal Paradigm, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 763 (2003). 
 156. See, e.g., David Bilchitz, Avoidance Remains Avoidance:  Is It Desirable in Socio-
Economic Rights Cases?, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 297, 304 (2014). 
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the ability to evict occupiers, with the suggestion that the obligation 
to progressively realize the right to housing requires enforcement of 
the existing queue, certain municipalities have sought to elevate the 
housing waiting list to constitutional doctrine.157  This has not, how-
ever, been accepted by courts, although they have been careful not to 
impose their own ordering in its place.  In many cases, courts have 
ordered negotiated resolutions between the parties (the remedy of 
“meaningful engagement”) or other procedural methods of redress, 
rather than issue strong, individual remedies.158  In others, courts 
have indicated an even stronger fidelity to the existing prioritization 
of access to housing, emphasizing the difficulties faced by the gov-
ernment in addressing housing needs and development more broadly.  
In Residents of Joe Slovo, for example, Justice Yacoob, who had 
penned the unanimous judgment supporting the right to housing in 
Grootboom, emphasized that the evictions and relocations at the basis 
of the claimants’ appeal were occurring in order to facilitate housing 
development, and that others had stakes in this development.159  Un-
der such conditions, the evictions met the test of reasonableness.160  
This consideration has been criticized as “inverting the rights enti-
tlements in question in the case, such that the constitutional rights of 
those not before the Court appear, through the reasonableness test, to 
‘trump’ the right to housing of the plaintiffs.”161   
Other members of the Constitutional Court have indicated a 
great willingness to scrutinize current housing priorities in addressing 
 
 157. See, e.g., City of Johannesburg Metro. Municipality v. Blue Moonlight Properties 
39 (Pty.) Ltd. 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) para. 21 (S. Afr.) (City of Johannesburg making 
submissions that the queue represents “the sequence of steps in [the State’s] housing policy 
directed at the progressive realisation of housing rights, namely, from emergency housing to 
temporary accommodation and then finally to permanent accommodation”); see also Young, 
supra note 106 (analyzing the argument that the queue could fill the doctrinal vacuum of the 
obligation to progressively realize the right to housing). 
 158. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Twp., and 197 Main St., Johannesburg v. City 
of Johannesburg, 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) (S. Afr.); Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various 
Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also Lilian Chenwi, Democratizing the 
Socio-Economic Rights Enforcement Process, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, 178, 180–88; Ray, supra note 149; infra note 266. 
 159. Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty. W. Cape v. Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) 
paras. 115–16. 
 160. Id. paras. 116–18. 
 161. JESSIE HOHMANN, THE RIGHT TO HOUSING:  LAW, CONCEPTS, POSSIBILITIES 100–02 
(2013) (suggesting that the standard of reasonableness moves the right to housing from “a 
transformative, substantive right, towards administrative oversight of government 
procedure”).  But see LIEBENBERG, supra note 30, at 173–86 (indicating a fuller role for 
reasonableness review); Young, supra note 30 (suggesting a more weighted decision-making 
process in assessments of reasonableness). 
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claims of rights infringements.  In Joe Slovo, several justices noted 
their dissatisfaction with the “either/or” nature of legal title versus the 
status of “unlawful occupier” in the context of South Africa’s histo-
ry;162 and argued for a less “mechanistic” application of property en-
titlements under a public law, rather than private law, paradigm.163  
On this latter view, the constitutional right to housing is said to usher 
in (and even compel) a “move away from a static, typically private-
law conceptualist view of the Constitution as a guarantee of the sta-
tus quo to a dynamic, typically public-law view of the Constitution as 
an instrument for social change and transformation.”164  Yet it is clear 
that the criticism of “queue jumping” casts a long shadow over such 
cases.  Before unpacking this criticism, let us introduce Canada’s, 
and then Australia’s, practice of queue talk. 
B. Canada and Health Care Rights 
“Queue jumping” in Canadian political discourse takes place 
in a very different context from South Africa.  Rather than a public 
housing program, the metaphor of the queue, and its evasion, is used 
to describe a subversion of the public health care system.165  The 
queue is the waiting list established for this publicly-funded care:  
services deemed “medically necessary” under the Canada Health Act, 
whose scarcity requires some mechanism for distribution for patients 
in need.166  Following a distributive principle of providing health care 
based on need and not ability to pay, the federal government matches 
provincial spending on covered services in exchange for a provincial 
prohibition on “user charges” by hospitals or “extra billing” by phy-
sicians.167  Jumping the queue is the act of subverting the planned 
 
 162. Joe Slovo Cmty. W. Cape, 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) para. 148 (Moseneke, D.C.J.), 
para. 291 (O’Regan, J.), para. 343 (Sachs, J.). 
 163. Id. para. 343–44 (Sachs, J.). 
 164. Id. para. 343; see also Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2005 (1) 
SA 217 (CC) para. 16 (S. Afr.) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of SA Ltd. v. Comm’r for the S. 
African Revenue Servs. 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC)).  For a different invocation of a 
transformational jurisprudence, see YOUNG, supra note 14, chs. 5–7; Dennis M. Davis, The 
Scope of the Judicial Role in the Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights:  Limits and 
Possibilities Viewed from the South African Experience, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, 197. 
 165. For a recent, more focused use of the term in Canada, as applicable to remedial 
redress in constitutional litigation, see Kent Roach, Polycentricity and Queue Jumping in 
Public Law Remedies:  A Two-Track Response, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 3 (2016). 
 166. Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-6 (support for “medically necessary” hospital 
care and “medically required” physician services). 
 167. Id. §§ 18–20.  Further prohibitions or disincentives are applied to private insurance 
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distribution system by “purchasing” hospital or physician services 
outside of the waiting list, for example, by accessing cataract surgery 
through a private clinic168 or the H1N1 vaccine outside of the gov-
ernment-approved priority line.169  Invoking a set of ordering as-
sumptions very different from South Africa’s public housing register, 
the queue is the waiting list for particular medical services that ap-
plies to all Canadians, not just those who have been means-tested as 
qualifying for a public subsidy. 
“Queue jumpers” are therefore deemed the especially privi-
leged or politically influential in society––those who can exit the 
program and access services over others in the wait list, by paying for 
private medical care or by exploiting political connections.170  The 
 
for publicly insured services.  Colleen M. Flood & Tom Archibald, The Illegality of Private 
Health Care in Canada, 164 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 825 (2001). 
 168. A report by the federal Health Ministry on compliance under the Canada Health 
Act found that “[i]n 2008–2009, the most prominent concerns with respect to compliance 
under the Canada Health Act remained concerning patient changes for medically necessary 
services in private clinics, and queue jumping.”  HEALTH CANADA, CANADA HEALTH ACT 
ANNUAL REPORT 2011–2012, at 1 (2012).  One commentator describes “both the success of 
these private clinics in attracting affluent patients and the consternation of the Canadian 
public with these clinics” and discusses public criticism of “queue jumpers.”  DONALD A. 
BARR, INTRODUCTION TO U.S. HEALTH POLICY:  THE ORGANIZATION, FINANCING, AND 
DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 54 (4th ed. 2016) (referencing a June 18, 2007 
Montreal Gazette news story “criticiz[ing] Jack Layton, leader of the New Democratic Party, 
for ‘jumping the queue’ and undergoing hernia surgery at a private clinic[] . . . [and 
reporting] that the president of the Canadian Autoworkers union had jumped the queue to get 
an MRI of his leg”).  Such references are ongoing, including many references in 
parliamentary debates.  See, e.g., 148 Official Report (Hansard) No. 103 (Nov. 2, 2016) 
(statement of Member of Parliament Kamal Khera) (“Permitting payments for faster access 
to medically necessary services such as MRIs or CT scans at private diagnostic clinics, what 
has often been called ‘queue jumping,’ contravenes both the spirit and accessibility criteria 
of the Canada Health Act. . . .  This is not access based on medical need.  This is access 
based on ability or willingness to pay and it runs counter to the underlying principle of 
Canada's health care system.”). 
 169. E.g., Karen Howlett et al., Private-Clinic Patients Jump the Line For Flu Shot, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-fitness/ 
health/conditions/private-clinic-patients-jump-the-line-for-flu-shot/article1204357 
(describing reports that public health agencies in Toronto and Vancouver had administered 
several thousand doses of the H1N1 vaccine to private clinics that treated patients who had 
paid an annual membership fee); see also BARR, supra note 168, at 54. 
 170. Alberta launched a Health Care Preferential Access Inquiry in 2012, which found, 
in the words of the Commissioner, Mr. Vertes, “incidents of improper preferential access 
and . . . several systemic issues that could foster and environment conducive to such 
improper access.”  Carrie Tait, Queue-jumping Common in Alberta Health-care System, 
Inquiry Finds, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/ 
politics/queue-jumping-common-in-alberta-health-care-system-inquiry-finds/article13900 
015.  However, the inquiry did not find “specific evidence that anyone had been medically 
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victims of “queue jumping” are imagined, not only as the (actually 
quite small)171 proportion of people on the waiting list at any one 
time, but also the access of Canadian citizens as a whole, and particu-
larly lower-income Canadians, given the potential effects on the 
long-term sustainability of the “single-tier” model of health care fi-
nancing in Canada.172  In some cases, such as for access to scarce 
vaccines, this is because the “queue jumper” directly diverts re-
sources away from those on the government wait list.  But in others, 
it is understood that the evasion of the queue undermines the solidari-
ty, and, more indirectly, the resources that support public health 
care.173  In this respect, even though the number of resources availa-
ble in the queue remains the same, “queue jumping” destabilizes the 
universalist ideals espoused in the Canada Health Act:  a statute 
which “holds a . . . talismanic power over progressive Canadians, and 
is viewed as the Magna Carta of universal health care.”174  The queue 
is recognized as universal:  exit from it connotes a breakdown of the 
justification for public health care,175 as well as the creation of a 
 
harmed” as a result of queue jumping.  Id. 
 171. One conservative-leaning think-tank estimated that, with 894,449 procedures in 
2015, and the assumption that each person waited for only one procedure, 2.5% of 
Canadians were on a waiting list in 2015.  BACCHUS BARUA, WAITING YOUR TURN:  WAIT 
TIMES FOR HEALTH CARE IN CANADA, 2015 REPORT, at iv (2015), https://www.fraserinstitute. 
org/sites/default/files/waiting-your-turn-2015.pdf. 
 172. For a canvassing of this argument, see Robert G. Evans, Health Care Reform:  
Who’s Selling the Market, and Why?, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH MED. 45 (1997). 
 173. Commentators note that principles of solidarity were also undermined by under-
investments, austerity, and federalism-stymied reforms in Medicare in the 1990s.  See, e.g., 
Vandna Bhatia, Social Rights, Civil Rights and Health Reform in Canada, 23 GOVERNANCE 
37, 40, 43 (2010) (drawing attention to the individualized consumer claim made against the 
waiting list, and suggesting that such claims of right make private financing more 
compelling); see also CAROLYN HUGHES TUOHY, ACCIDENTAL LOGICS:  THE DYNAMICS OF 
CHANGE IN THE HEALTH CARE ARENA IN THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND CANADA 231–34, 
254–62 (1999) (noting the importance of different coalitions of political support—which 
must include the medical profession—for securing publicly financed health care systems). 
 174. Colleen M. Flood, Litigating Health Rights in Canada:  A White Knight for 
Equity?, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 79, 84 (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyel Gross eds., 2014); see also Chaoulli v. Quebec 
(Att’y Gen), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.), para. 16 (suggesting the principles of access 
underlying Canadian Health Act have “become the hallmarks of Canadian identity.  Any 
measure that might be perceived as compromising them has a polarizing effect on public 
opinion”) (Deschamps, J.); ROY J. ROMANOW, BUILDING ON VALUES:  THE FUTURE OF 
HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 47 (Nov. 2002) [hereinafter Romanow Report], http:// 
publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CP32-85-2002E.pdf (citing a comment that 
“[m]edicare has as much iconic force here as the Constitution does in the USA”). 
 175. COLLEEN M. FLOOD, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM:  A LEGAL, ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (2000) (arguing from principles expressed in ALBERT O. 
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breakaway market.176 
Defenders of privatized access to health care do not, of 
course, see the practice in “queue jumping” terms; theirs, rather, are 
claims of right.  The most well-known manifestation of this defense 
involved the constitutional challenge mounted by a doctor, Dr. 
Jacques Chaoulli, and a patient, Mr. George Zeliotis, on the ban by 
Quebec on private health insurance.  The Supreme Court of Canada 
partly accepted their claim that the prohibition on private health in-
surance infringed the right to life and security of the person under 
Section 1 of Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms177 and 
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.178  By a 
4–3 majority, the Supreme Court accepted that the health care financ-
ing system had required patients to endure long wait times in the pub-
lic system, which interfered with their rights to life and personal se-
curity in violation of the Quebec Charter, although only three Justices 
accepted that an infringement of the Canadian Charter had occurred, 
thus limiting the national effect of the judgment.179  The Supreme 
Court thus overturned the legislative ban on private health insurance, 
holding that it infringed the constitutional rights of Quebeckers.180  
The dissent, on the other hand, noted the inevitability of waiting lists; 
that “rationing occurs on the basis of clinical need rather than wealth 
and social status”; and that “who should be allowed to jump the 
queue . . . [in] a public system founded on the values of equity, soli-
darity and collective responsibility . . . can and should be addressed 
on a case by case basis.”181 
The Chaoulli decision has been criticized as representing an 
unwarranted judicial intervention in social policy and described in 
one prominent comment as “worse than Lochner.”182  Under this 
 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND STATES (1970)). 
 176. For the view that “[m]arkets have a way of breaking out” when “there are people 
who want to buy [something] and others who want to sell it,” see JOHN MCMILLAN, 
REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS 5, 16 (2002); see also, id. at 
32–36, 160–61 (discussing limitations on a market for health care). 
 177.  Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms of Québec, C.Q.L.R. c. C-12 (Can.). 
 178. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 179. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.) [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.); see also Flood, supra 
note 174, at 94. 
 180. Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791. 
 181. Id. para. 223 (Binnie & LeBell, JJ., dissenting). 
 182. Sujit Choudhry, Worse than Lochner?, in ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE:  
THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA 75, 75 (Colleen M. 
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view, the Supreme Court of Canada committed three prominent mis-
takes that were attributed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s notorious 
overturning of a statute which limited workers’ hours on health 
grounds183––first, in overreaching in the judicial role; second, in en-
acting a theory of economic libertarianism; and third, when read in 
comparison with other contemporary Charter decisions implicating 
economic and social rights,184 in suggesting a bias in favor of middle 
class claimants over earlier unsuccessful claimants.  Added to these 
criticisms was the majority’s unsophisticated reliance on compari-
sons with other health systems;185 evidence that served to support a 
conclusion that the presence of a parallel private sector would not 
necessarily undermine the equality of the public health care regime. 
Nonetheless, the fact that Chaoulli established only a narrow 
“negative” right tied to the Quebec system has limited its effect.186  
Similar prohibitions in other provinces remain in force.  Moreover, 
the form of remedy issued in the Chaoulli case––a declaration against 
the impugned legislation, stayed for one year––provided Quebec with 
“some room for policy maneuver.”187  In 2006, the province passed 
an amending statute that addressed the time spent on wait lists.188  
This statute empowered the Health Minister to identify and circum-
 
Flood et al. eds., 2005). 
 183. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (ruling 5–4 that the law limiting bakers’ 
working hours was invalid, as an interference with the liberty of contract; thus giving rise to 
the so-called Lochner era of substantive due process).  Justice Holmes’s famous dissent 
accused the majority of judicial activism, of imputing to the Constitution a particular 
economic theory, and of favoring laissez-faire. Id. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 184. Choudhry, supra note 182, at 93–94 (comparing Charter decisions of Auton v. 
British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 78 (Can.) and Gosselin v. Quebec (Att’y 
Gen.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (Can.) against Chaoulli). 
 185. See Colleen M. Flood, Chaoulli:  Political Undertows and Judicial Riptides, 2008 
HEALTH L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 211, 212 (providing an analysis of the flaws of the Supreme 
Court’s “simplistic” use of international and comparative materials); see also Choudhry, 
supra note 182, at 80 (describing an argument that the majority’s recourse to OECD data 
was “amateur public policy tourism”); Kent Roach, The Courts and Medicare:  Too Much or 
Too Little Judicial Activism, in ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE:  THE LEGAL DEBATE 
OVER PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA, supra note 182, at 184, 193; see generally 
TUOHY, supra note 173, at 263–65 (noting the dangers of comparative studies in health care 
policy-making). 
 186. Flood, supra note 174, at 95–96. 
 187. Id. at 95; see also Lorraine E. Weinrib, Charter Perspectives on Chaoulli:  The 
Body and the Body Politic, in ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE:  THE LEGAL DEBATE 
OVER PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA, supra note 182, at 56, 56. 
 188. An Act to Amend the Act Respecting Health Services and Social Services and 
Other Legislative Provisions, S.Q. 2006, c 43 (Can.). 
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vent long wait lists by implementing alternative procedures, and es-
tablished a specific market for the sale and purchase of insurance “for 
hip, knee, and cataract surgeries.”189  In this latter context, Quebec 
also instituted a mechanism by which demand for private health in-
surance would be kept low by guaranteeing public payment for pri-
vate admission if the wait for certain surgery exceeded six months.190 
Thus, ten years after the Chaoulli decision, the provincial sin-
gle-payer universal health insurance plans have not changed, in part, 
perhaps, because the constituency for reform––either private life and 
health insurance firms or politicians––appears to have had little in-
centive to challenge it.191  Nonetheless, a reframed discourse of 
rights, and with it the counter-discourse of “queue jumping,” now set 
the parameters of much of the political discourse around health care 
in Canada.  Focus on the queue gives rise to complaints against the 
system itself, rather than government underfunding:  that is, the wait 
times are seen to compromise the health of Canadians.192  Newer 
rights claimants defend their right to private services—and to jump 
the queue—on the basis of newly reframed solidarity goals.193  In an 
ideological setting with markedly different contours than South Afri-
ca’s, the collective social right to health care in Canadian Medicare 
has been transformed into “health care as an individual’s civil right—
that is, something that individualized consumers have the right to ob-
tain freely in a marketized society.”194  This case study shows the 
deep, but also deeply contingent, ideological and political aspects of 
queue talk. 
 
 189. Id. art. 42; Flood, supra note 174, at 95. 
 190. Flood, supra note 174, at 95 n.90; see also An Act to Amend the Act Respecting 
Health Services and Social Services and Other Legislative Provisions, S.Q. 2006, c 43,  arts. 
7, 8, 17(1) (Can.).  For summary of subsequent litigation, see Flood, supra note 174, at 96. 
 191. Daniel Cohn, Chaoulli Ten Years On:  Still About Nothing? (2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (paper prepared for the 2015 Canadian Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, Ottawa). 
 192. E.g., BARUA, supra note 171 (reporting Fraser Institute surveys). 
 193. Bhatia, supra note 173, at 52–53.  Bhatia cites one example of how solidarity 
norms are changed through queue talk; Keith Martin, physician and Member of Parliament, 
states: 
The problem is that we have been cutting away at our [publicly funded] 
healthcare system, and now we are cutting the muscle and bone of the 
system. . . .  Under a private system, as individuals move off public waiting 
lists to private ones, waiting lists in the public system would decrease, resulting 
in faster access for people—especially on the public system.  Essentially, those 
who can afford to pay for medical services would be subsidizing those who 
cannot. 
Id. (italics omitted). 
 194. Id. at 40. 
yuiosdfsd  
2016] RIGHTS AND QUEUES 107 
C. Australia and Asylum Rights 
In Australia, the “queue jumping” metaphor has been a cen-
tral trope in political debates deployed by those that support the re-
striction of access to asylum processing, especially by asylum seekers 
arriving by boat.  The queue represents the waiting list for a limited 
number of temporary or permanent visas that are granted by the Aus-
tralian executive on humanitarian grounds.195  In this political dis-
course, the practice of “queue jumping” is presented as the act of ar-
riving in Australia by boat and forcing the processing of a refugee 
claim in front of other refugees who have registered with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the “UNHCR”) in camps 
or other sites abroad.196 
The so-called “queue jumpers” are desperate people, mainly, 
in the last decade, from Afghanistan and Iraq, who are seeking pro-
tection.197  When processed, most maritime asylum seekers have 
 
 195. In 2015, Australia’s quota was set at 13,750 places, which included 6000 offshore 
applicants (reserved for those recommended by the UNHCR), and 7750 for a special 
humanitarian program.  See Jane McAdam, Editorial, Australia and Asylum Seekers, 25 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 435, 438 (2013); see also Janet Phillips, Asylum Seekers and Refugees:  
What Are the Facts?, (Mar. 2, 2015), http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/ 
prspub/HGNW6/upload_binary/HGNW6.pdf;fileType=application/pdf#search=%22asylum
%20seekers%20and%20refugees%22.  For some recent revisions, see infra note 216 and 
accompanying text. 
 196. Australia is one of the twenty-six States Parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
out of an overall 145, which participate in the UNHCR resettlement program and accept 
quotas of refugees on an annual basis.  Others include Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Uruguay.  U.N. High Comm’r for 
Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3 (2011), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html; 
see also Information on UNHCR Resettlement, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/information-on-unhcr-resettlement.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2016).  Notwithstanding that 
resettlement has attracted criticisms “that it facilitates ‘brain drain’, is susceptible to fraud 
and abuse, and is an expensive durable solution that benefits only a limited number of 
refugees,” its more comprehensive approach is commended by other commentators insofar 
as it is “an expression of international solidarity and a means of burden or responsibility 
sharing.”  Gil Loescher & James Milner, UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees, 
in GLOBAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE 189, 203 (Alexander Betts ed., 2011). 
 197. An analysis of data from the then-Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
found the largest number arrived from Afghanistan and Iran, with the subsequent countries 
being Sri Lanka and Pakistan.  The majority of those arriving by boat were also male, and 
aged between 18–30.  Australia and Asylum Seekers:  The Key Facts You Need To Know, 
GUARDIAN:  DATABLOG, https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/jul/02/australia-
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been found to be declared refugees, that is, have been found to have a 
“well-founded fear of being persecuted,” based on “reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion,” thus invoking Australia’s obligations under the Refu-
gee Convention.198  The harm of “queue jumping” is attributed both 
to the refugees waiting patiently in camps or urban sites abroad, as 
well as to the general system of orderly control of Australia’s immi-
gration system.199  References to the control and security of the bor-
der are frequently made,200 and the policy to deter “queue jumpers” 
by “turning back the boats” has deep populist appeal.201  Indeed, it is 
impossible to overstate the resonance of the “queue jumping” meta-
 
asylum-seekers#data (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
 198. The Refugee Convention was completed in Geneva on July 28, 1951.  Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.  The Protocol was 
signed on January 31, 1967, and ratified by Australia on December 13, 1973.  Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.  The 
Convention covers events causing a refugee problem before January 1, 1951, while the 
Protocol extends the definition to events occurring after that date.  Data from 2013, for 
example, showed that over ninety-three percent of boat arrivals were Convention refugees.  
McAdam, supra note 195, at 446–47. 
 199. As Jane McAdam notes, the notion of “queue jumping” can be traced to a dual 
system of processing, whereby offshore applicants “recognized by UNHCR as having a 
protection need” are reserved a certain quota (6000) and boat and plane arrivals then 
displace others who would enter through a special humanitarian quota.  McAdam, supra 
note 195, at 438–39. 
 200. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship changed its name in 2013 to the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection.  Administrative Arrangements Order 
2013 (Cth) (Austl.).  Operation Sovereign Borders—which took effect on the day the new 
conservative government of Tony Abbott was sworn in on September 18, 2013—is a 
military-led operation premised on the idea that Australia is experiencing a border protection 
crisis that constituted a national emergency.  McAdam, supra note 195, at 440; see also 
Operation Sovereign Borders, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T IMMIGR. & BORDER PROTECTION, 
http://www.osb.border.gov.au/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).  The Australian Border Force 
was established in 2015 to integrate, amongst other tasks, investigations into both “illicit 
goods and immigration malpractice.”  Who We Are, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T IMMIGR. & 
BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.border.gov.au/australian-border-force-abf/who-we-are 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
 201. Andreas Schloenhardt & Colin Craig, ‘Turning Back the Boats’:  Australia’s 
Interdiction of Irregular Migrants at Sea, 27 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 536 (2015).  For analysis 
of popular response, see Katherine Gelber, A Fair Queue?  Australian Public Discourse on 
Refugees and Immigration, J. AUSTRALIAN STUD., Jan. 2003, at 23; Fiona H. McKay et al., 
‘It Would Be Okay If They Came Through the Proper Channels’:  Community Perceptions 
and Attitudes Toward Asylum Seekers in Australia, 25 J. REFUGEE STUD. 113, 117, 125 
(2011); Anne Pedersen et al., The Role of False Beliefs in the Community’s and the Federal 
Government’s Attitudes Toward Australian Asylum Seekers, 41 AUSTRALIAN J. SOC. ISSUES 
105 (2006). 
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phor in this context by the Australian media, politicians, and public 
officials (although expressly not by courts).  The epithet is used “to 
pillory [the] opponent’s sense of fairness” and “to denigrate the un-
deserving and disorderly claims for protection” of asylum seekers ar-
riving by boat.202  In this respect, the metaphor invokes the particular 
hostility directed to boat arrivals (in a nation with no land borders), 
as opposed to other, controlled, modes of entry (namely, by air).  A 
long preoccupation of Australian policy, this hostility has increased 
in the most recent phase of arrivals,203 and, indeed, the issue of boat 
arrivals was pivotal in the re-election of Prime Minister John Howard 
after the infamous Tampa incident in 2001.204  The two major parties 
in Australia now agree on a policy of refusing entry to those who ar-
rive by boat.205  This bipartisan agreement is significant in a policy 
context that is invariably viewed as under executive control and in a 
constitutional system in which rights protections are largely entrusted 
to the legislature.206 
Australia is a party to the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 
Protocol, a central tenet of which is that persons seeking a declaration 
of refugee status acquire certain rights as soon as they are under a 
States Parties’ jurisdiction or territory.207  This includes the duty of 
 
 202. DARSHAN VIGNESWARAN, TERRITORY, MIGRATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM at ix–x (2013). 
 203. Boat arrivals have occupied a particular place in modern Australia’s politics and 
have come in three distinct phases:  from the first arrivals from Vietnam in the 1970s (small 
numbers accepted), to the second in the 1990s, and the last, latest, and particularly virulent 
discourse.  See, e.g., JANET PHILLIPS & HARRIET SPINKS, BOAT ARRIVALS IN AUSTRALIA 
SINCE 1976 (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bn/sp/boatarrivals. 
pdf.  For a slightly different categorization, see FRANK BRENNAN, TAMPERING WITH ASYLUM:  
A UNIVERSAL HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM 7 (rev. ed. 2007) (noting the first Vietnamese, 
Cambodian, and Chinese arrivals, until the last phase, beginning late 1999, with arrivals in 
larger numbers, from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran via Indonesia). 
 204. This incident and its repercussions through the judicial, executive, and 
parliamentary branches is examined in detail in BRENNAN, supra note 203, at 33–68; see also 
DAVID MARR & MARIAN WILKINSON, DARK VICTORY (2003) (providing an investigative 
account of the electoral campaign’s focus on boat people, including those rescued by the 
Norwegian container vessel the Tampa in August 2001). 
 205. A Humane and Compassionate Approach to Asylum Seekers, LAB. PARTY, http:// 
www.alp.org.au/asylumseekers (last visited Dec. 2, 2016); Our Plan:  Protecting Our 
Borders, LIBERAL PARTY, https://www.liberal.org.au/our-plan/protecting-our-borders (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
 206. Mary Crock, Judging Refugees:  The Clash of Power and Institutions in the 
Development of Australian Refugee Law, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 51 (2004); see supra note 113 
(describing the lack of a federal constitutional or legislative human rights framework and the 
limited patchwork of state-based statutory rights protections in Australia). 
 207. These include those that arise, as summarized by James Hathaway and Michelle 
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non-refoulement, meaning they may not be returned to a dangerous 
country once they are at the border, giving rise to a de facto “individ-
ual right of asylum” that the Convention itself avoids.208  Indeed, 
Australia was one of the key states involved in the design of this 
Convention,209 having legislated its obligations under the Migration 
Act 1958.210  Australia’s acceptance of refugees is presently set at 
13,750 per year,211 which is a small number compared with other 
countries, on a per capita or geographical measure.212  In light of the 
virulence of the populist discourse against “queue jumpers,” Austral-
ia has adopted a system of mandatory detention of asylum seekers 
and now processes the claims of boat arrivals “off-site” through ex-
pensive administrative arrangements outside of Australia on Nauru 
and Papua New Guinea.213  In these arrangements, all people seeking 
 
Foster, under “Arts. 3 (non-discrimination), 4 (religious freedom), 12 (respect for personal 
status), 13 (preservation of property rights), 16(1) (access to the courts), 20 (access to 
rationing systems), . . . 29 (fiscal equity), 31 (non-penalization for illegal entry and freedom 
from arbitrary detention), and 34 (consideration for naturalization)” as well as Art. 33 (duty 
of non-refoulement).  JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE 
STATUS 40, 46–47 (2d ed. 2014). 
 208. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 198, art. 33; see also 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 102 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  Indeed, it might be seen 
that the principle of non-refoulement privileges onshore, rather than offshore, arrivals, in 
contradistinction with Australia’s peculiar approach.  See McAdam, supra note 195, at 439; 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 39A (Austl.). 
 209. Crock, supra note 206, 53–54. 
 210. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 39A (Austl.). 
 211. Phillips, supra note 195, at 1.  For attention to the special numbers reserved for 
refugees from Syria, see infra note 216. 
 212. Compare with 70,000 placements in 2015 in the United States, an annual range of 
between 10,000 and 14,000 in Canada (bolstered to 44,800 in 2016), and individual quotas 
in Europe.  White House, Presidential Memorandum—FY 2015 Refugee Admissions (Sep. 
30, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/presidential-
memorandum-fy-2015-refugee-admissions; Gov’t of Austl., Country Chapter:  Australia, in 
UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK (Apr. 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/3c5e542d4.html; 
Gov’t of Can., Country Chapter:  Canada, in UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK (Oct. 
2016), http://www.unhcr.org/3c5e55594.html; Gov’t of U.S., Country Chapter:  United 
States, in UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK (Oct. 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/3c5e5 
a764.html.  Europe’s present refugee influx saw over 1,000,000 arrivals by sea in 2015, and 
even greater numbers of refugees seek protection outside of Europe.  Jonathan Clayton & 
Hereward Holland, Over One Million Sea Arrivals Reach Europe in 2015, UNHCR (Dec. 
30, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-
reach-europe-2015.html.  For further evidence, see infra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 213. BRENNAN, supra note 203, at 127–38 (providing a history of the so-called “Pacifici 
Solution”); see, e.g., Michael Pezzullo, Sec’y, Dep’t of Immigration & Border Prot., 
Opening Statement to the Senate Select Committee Regarding the Regional Processing 
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to arrive in Australia by boat are intercepted and taken to external 
sites:  any asylum seekers found to be refugees under these processes 
are sought to be resettled outside Australia.214  The motivation for the 
off-shore detention scheme is expressed as a way of “stopping the 
flow of boats” and removing the incentives that people may have to 
risk travel to Australia by refusing any visa at the end of the voy-
age.215  At the same time, the Australian government has committed 
itself to increasing its quota of humanitarian and protection visas, 
particularly in light of the recent surge in numbers from Syria.216  
Thus, while the government has increased the size of the quota for 
entry into Australia, in light of certain humanitarian events, those 
who seek to access this “queue” outside of its terms of entry––
namely, boat arrivals––are barred from it. 
 
Centre in Nauru (June 9, 2015), http://www.border.gov.au/about/news-media/speeches-
presentations/2015/regional-processing-centre-in-nauru (noting, along with details of the 
challenges associated with each processing center, that the Australian government first 
signed agreements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea in August and September 2012, 
respectively).  After the PNG Supreme Court held that the detention center at Manus Island 
was unconstitutional, the two countries have negotiated its impending closure.  See 
Stephanie Anderson, Manus Island Detention Centre to Be Shut, Papua New Guinea Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill Says, ABC (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-
27/png-pm-oneill-to-shut-manus-island-detention-centre/7364414; see also Stephanie 
Anderson, Manus Island Detention Centre to Close, Peter Dutton and PNG Prime Minister 
Confirm, ABC (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-17/manus-island-to-
close-png-prime-minister-confirms/7759810. 
 214. The federal government has proposed legislation that will prevent any asylum 
seeker whose claim was processed on Nauru or Manus Island from ever entering Australia.  
See Dan Conifer, Manus Island, Nauru Refugees to be Banned from Entering Australia, 
Malcolm Turnbull Says, ABC (Oct. 30, 2016), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-
30/manus-nauru-refugees-asylum-seekers-to-be-banned-turnbull-says/7978228. 
 215. The former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, has recommended a similar policy of 
deterrence for Europe’s current refugee crisis.  See Austin Ramzy, Tony Abbott, Ousted 
Australian Leader, Urges Europe to Take Hard Line on Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/world/australia/tony-abbott-australia-europe-
migrant-crisis.html. 
 216. Canada announced in November 2015 that it would admit 25,000 Syrian refugees.  
Adrian Edwards, Syrian Refugees Receive Warm Welcome in Canada, UNHCR (Dec. 11, 
2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2015/12/566ad0029/syrian-refugees-receive-
warm-welcome-canada.html.  In September 2015 Australia announced a commitment of 
12,000 additional humanitarian visas in response to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, awarded 
with special priority to those “assessed as being most vulnerable—persecuted minorities, 
women, children and families with the least prospect of ever returning safely to their homes, 
[and] located in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.”  Australia’s Response to the Syrian and Iraqi 
Humanitarian Crisis, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION, 
https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Refu/response-syrian-humanitarian-crisis (last visited Dec. 
2, 2016). 
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This example demonstrates our third context in which queue 
talk has become ubiquitous and in which it openly contrasts with 
rights talk.217  In many ways, this context is an idiosyncratic one from 
which to analyze the discourses of rights and queues.  First, a na-
tion’s immigration policy is substantively distinct from its housing or 
health care policies.  Second, the norms of distributive justice that are 
debated by a political community in resolving national housing and 
health care contestations are very different from those that must be 
negotiated in determining who may become entrants to that political 
community in the first place.218  Indeed, many have observed an in-
verse relation between the generosity of a welfare state and the open-
ness of its borders.219  Yet the example is illuminating.  Despite its 
different setting, queue talk in the Australian asylum-seeking context 
reveals many of the same assumptions of the South African and Ca-
nadian examples.  Disaggregating these assumptions helps to clarify 
the stakes of queue talk and emphasize how the political discourse of 
“queue jumping” distorts the legal relations between rights and 
queues. 
III. DISAGGREGATING THE QUEUE AS METAPHOR AND CONCEPT 
We have seen that the connotations of “queue jumping” are 
distinct in South Africa, Canada, and Australia.  While those seeking 
to access public housing, private health care, or asylum are all 
deemed as evading norms of fairness and order, these norms are ex-
pressed in very different ideological settings.  In this section, I return 
to the frame of rights versus queues and examine the discursive role 
played by the metaphor against the conceptual classifications pre-
sented in Part I.  I suggest that the underlying narrative structure of 
these three examples of the queue is one that underlines the distinc-
tion between three broad instruments of distribution in modern states:  
rights, markets, and government.  In adopting certain assumptions 
 
 217. For an examination of the human rights obligations around non-refoulement, see 
Vijay M. Padmanabhan, To Transfer or Not to Transfer:  Identifying and Protecting 
Relevant Human Rights Interests in Non-Refoulement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (2011). 
 218. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 103; JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).  For 
further discussion, see infra Part III.B.3. 
 219. See, e.g., Matthew J. Gibney, Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to 
Refugees, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 169, 173 (1999) (suggesting that “[t]o demand that a state 
show equal concern and respect to those beyond the state may be to ask it to pursue policies 
that would undermine those practices and institutions which make for a semblance of 
equality and social justice within the state”); Michael W. Howard, Basic Income and 
Migration Policy:  A Moral Dilemma? BASIC INCOME STUD., June 2006, at 1. 
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about each, queue talk is a discourse that suggests that order is pref-
erable to corruption, bureaucracies are preferable to markets, and 
governments are preferable to courts.  And yet the inconsistencies 
that I described as inherent in the legal concept of the queue, set out 
in Part I of this Article, show that the assumptions are contestable, or, 
as I suggest in Section A below, that they raise but do not resolve the 
critical distributional questions that attend housing, health care, and 
claims of asylum.  Moreover, as I argue in Section B, queue talk ob-
scures the complexities within each. 
A. Unresolved Questions 
Queue talk poses a number of questions about the preferable 
methods of ordering in society, but the answers it suggests are unreli-
able.  Each of the case studies shows us how queue talk operates to 
imply the strengths and failures of certain ordering systems, based on 
certain assumptions about rights, markets, and government.  In each 
context, the queue metaphor is used to raise complaints about order 
and corruption, governments and markets, and governments and 
courts.  In housing, health care, and asylum seeking, queue talk sets 
up the method of appropriate ordering as a choice between two and 
responds by favoring the first alternative and dismissing the second.  
And yet, such answers are misleading due to the deep contingency of 
the queue in question. 
1. Order Versus Corruption 
The first connotation associates queues with order and their 
evasion with corruption.  In this sense, queues are related to the in-
tegrity of the rule of law itself.  Their breach consists of the deploy-
ment of arbitrariness, whether by power, influence, money, or decep-
tion.  Corruption is, of course, a major problem for the rule of law in 
the modern state and involves bending or upending formal systems of 
allocation.220  It is susceptible to several definitions.  The evasion of a 
publicly administered queue is most closely associated with a con-
ventional focus on public officials seeking private gain through brib-
ery, nepotism, and misappropriation.221  But such evasion is compli-
 
 220. See, for example, the World Bank’s two-decade long initiative against corruption.  
Anti-Corruption, THE WORLD BANK (May 10, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/ 
governance/brief/anti-corruption.  For an overview of this and other international initiatives, 
see Jan Wouters et. al., The International Legal Framework Against Corruption:  
Achievements and Challenges, 14 MELB. J. INT'L L. 205 (2013). 
 221. E.g., J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development:  A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 
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cated by the more extended meanings of “corruption,” such as signi-
fying moral disapproval of a situation when ruling elites and the 
wealthy fail to look after the poor and indigent.222  At the most basic 
level, public administration of any queue must occur in the presence 
of monopoly and discretion—two elements that public officials can 
exploit in engaging in corruption.  Outside of queues, other methods 
of public allocation may be less open to this form of corruption, 
however, it is worth noting that attempts to replace queueing systems 
with lotteries or randomized placements are also besieged by admin-
istrative difficulties.223 
In each of our case studies, defense of the queue is an argu-
ment for order, while “queue jumping” is associated with corruption.  
In South Africa, the association is most stark:  allegations and per-
ceptions of corruption have beleaguered the housing delivery system, 
which has been administered by provinces in ways open to abuse.224  
The complaint of corruption is targeted at government administrators, 
who, in their turn, are quick to allege improper land squatting on the 
part of community members, drawing on the same rhetoric of queue-
 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417 (1967).  Compare with the more market focused definitions which 
book “all payments [legal or illegal] to agents that are not passed on to superiors.”  SUSAN 
ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION:  A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 7 (1978); see also Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, When is Corruption Harmful?, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION:  CONCEPTS & 
CONTEXTS 353, 355, 358 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d. ed. 2002). 
 222. AKHIL GUPTA, RED TAPE:  BUREAUCRACY, STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE, AND POVERTY 
IN INDIA 80 (2012) (providing an ethnology of narratives and practices of corruption, and the 
related concept of brashtaachaar). 
 223. E.g., TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120.  In their follow up to an exploration of 
queues, Ronen Perry and Tal Zarsky explore lottery devices, which are also surprisingly 
present in law.  Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, “May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor”:  
Lotteries in Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1060 (2015).  While Perry and Zarsky note that 
lotteries are detached from human agency and discretion, and thus less open to corruption, 
the lack of accountability and reason that also follow from such processes may make 
corruptibility ironically more likely, in that there may, even in automated processes, be 
scope for lotteries to be carried out improperly.  Id. at 1060–64.  See also CALABRESI & 
BOBBITT, supra note 4, at 41–44 (comparing lottery and first-come-first-served); NEIL 
DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE:  ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING (1999); 
BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY (1999).  While lotteries are common to the award 
of certain visas in immigration regimes, which are relevant to our Australian illustration, the 
contemporary award of citizenship-by-birth can be understood to itself involve accidental, 
lot-like features.  See AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY:  CITIZENSHIP AND 
GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009) (presenting the policy prescriptions that flow from this 
conceptualization). 
 224. There is a current shift from provincial departments to accredited municipalities.  
See TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 9. 
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ing.225  During the auditing of one list, for example, “it was discov-
ered that 50 percent of beneficiaries’ ID numbers were invalid, while 
65 percent did not match the applicants’ records.”226  The complaint 
that the housing system is mired in corruption takes place against the 
backdrop of a recognized problem with official corruption in South 
Africa, which is widespread and widely reported.227 
Allegations of “queue jumping” as corruption would seem to 
be far afield in the higher income democracies of Canada and Aus-
tralia;228 nonetheless the sense of an inappropriate subversion of pub-
lic office for private gain is apparent in each system.  In Canada, such 
subversion occurred during the H1N1 vaccine scandal, where hockey 
players were given preference for access to a vaccine, before people 
deemed especially vulnerable and thus placed in priority in the medi-
cal wait list.229  In Australia, the perception of boat arrivals as “ille-
gals,” who pay smugglers to arrive by boat is tied to both ideas of 
system corruption, as well as market, discussed below.  In this re-
spect, “queue jumpers” are often perceived as “bogus” refugees or 
economic migrants, who are assumed to fall outside of the protection 
of international law.230  And more perniciously, associations between 
 
 225. Id. at 7.  These practices are monitored by Anti-Land Invasion Units, which draw 
on the rhetoric of the “queue” to justify evicting people from the land, houses, or buildings 
they occupy.  Id. 
 226. Id. at 61 (quoting Press Release, Dep’t of Hous. Gauteng Provincial Gov’t, An 
Appeal to Update Your Details on Demand Database (May 27, 2009), http://www.gov.za/ 
appeal-update-your-details-demand-database). 
 227. Margot Rubin, Perceptions of Corruption in the South African Housing Allocation 
and Delivery Programme:  What It May Mean for Accessing the State, 46 J. ASIAN & AFR. 
STUD. 479 (2011). 
 228. See Anti-Corruption, supra note 220 (describing corruption as a low-income 
country problem); Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) (giving a rank to the 
perceived levels of public sector corruption worldwide:  in 2015, placing Canada at ninth 
place, Australia thirteenth, and South Africa sixty-first for corruption). 
 229. Tait, supra note 170. 
 230. McAdam, supra note 195, at 436 (referring to the discourse of “illegals”); 
BRENNAN, supra note 203, at 56 (noting “[t]he Australian stereotype of . . . a young man 
from a wealthy family who cuts a deal with a people smuggler for transport to one of a range 
of first-world countries where the young man will be able to settle and provide the option for 
other family members to join him”).  In most cases, boat arrivals are, in fact, successful in 
acquiring refugee status once their claims are processed, far more so than other arrivals.  See, 
e.g., supra note 198 and accompanying text.  Those actually guilty of domestic and 
international crimes are prevented from accessing asylum through the international 
framework.  The Refugee Convention itself notes that persons seeking to evade legitimate 
prosecution or punishment for serious domestic crimes, those who have committed serious 
international crimes, or other acts contrary to the principles and purposes of the U.N. are 
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the illicit operations of people smugglers, human traffickers, and 
transnational organized crime are increasingly drawn,231 implying a 
system-level corruption in this mode of entry to Australia. 
Despite the power of this narrative, the association of “queue 
jumping” with corruption is often just that––a mere association creat-
ed by the broader defense of the queue as a legal, administrative pro-
cedure to be upheld.  The “queue jumping” as corruption complaint 
does not invariably pit queues against rights, as do the other distinc-
tions drawn out below, since there are much broader instances of cor-
ruption in the housing, health care, and immigration contexts than 
linked with those claiming rights in South Africa, Canada, and Aus-
tralia respectively.  There are thus parallel cases of those who attempt 
to gain access to goods and services by an illegal payment to, or other 
forms of undue influence on, government officials or third parties.  
Yet, if only by association, the perception of “queue jumping” as cor-
ruption is a particularly corrosive one for rights-claimants.  Whether 
they are used to allocate interests in housing, health care, or asylum, 
queues distribute scarce goods and, in doing so, enact the kind of 
“tragic choices” that Philip Bobbitt and Guido Calabresi analyzed in 
their seminal account of the conflicts that arise in the allocation of 
scarce resources.  In such choices, the values of honesty and equal 
treatment must be especially safeguarded, since honesty and fairness 
represent the “structural premises designed to moot, or at least set the 
terms of, any particular ordering of preferences.”232  When they are 
undermined (by corruption, actual or perceived), the present ordering 
of goods and opportunities is undermined, but so, too, are future at-
tempts to do so.233  The association of “queue jumping” with corrup-
tion produces a stigma on rights claimants in each of the settings of 
markets, courts, and rights claims described below. 
 
denied refugee status.  See Convention Relating to the Statute of Refugees, supra note 198, 
art 1(F); see also HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 207, at 524. 
 231. Such associations are increasingly made within Australia and internationally.  See, 
e.g., Matthew Cameron, From “Queue Jumpers” to “Absolute Scum of the Earth”:  Refugee 
and Organised Criminal Deviance in Australian Asylum Policy, 59 AUSTRALIAN J. POL. & 
HIST. 241, 242 (2013); see also Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air, Dec. 12, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507, as a supplement to Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, Dec. 12, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; Anne Gallagher, 
Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights:  Tricks and Treaties, FORCED MIGRATION REV., 
Jan. 2002, at 25, 25–28. 
 232. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 4, at 24. 
 233. For an assessment that anti-corruption strategies can undermine the state provision 
of the goods and services necessary for the fulfillment of economic and social rights, see, for 
example, James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and 
Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 125 (2009). 
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2. Bureaucracy Versus Market 
The second connotation of “queue jumping” relates to the 
availability of market access to the good or opportunity in question.  
The assumptions that set up bureaucracies against markets rely on the 
fact that queues support bureaucratic, or at least ex ante, decision-
making, while the evasion of these processes through payments relies 
on markets.234  Queues represent a general allocative scheme, usually 
administered by the government (although sometimes by private ac-
tors).  At the same time, opportunities for evasion are created by a 
market for acquiring a higher place in the queue or for skipping it al-
together.  Indeed, for political theorist Michael Sandel, the subver-
sion of queues is a quintessential example of the growing role of 
markets in society.  He emphasizes the associations between “queue 
jumping” and privilege:  “It’s long been known that, in fancy restau-
rants, a handsome tip . . . can shorten the wait on a busy night.”235  
“Queue jumping” by purchase adds to “the advantages of affluence 
and consigns the poor to the back of the line.”236 
Economists have favored both queues and the permissibility 
of “queue jumping,” for the reason that combining the two forms of 
allocation can be efficient.  In principle, the queue allocates goods 
according to willingness to wait, whereas markets allocate goods ac-
cording to willingness to pay.  It follows that the queue discriminates 
against those with less time, while the market discriminates against 
those with less money.237  In economic theory, then, a queueing sys-
tem, which operates with a secondary market (for instance, scalping), 
can be defended on efficiency grounds, since each unit of time is giv-
en a price.  At the very least, a system that allows for queue-jumping-
by-purchase is preferable, on efficiency grounds, to one that prevents 
this occurring.238 
The use of dollars to provide access outside of the queue is 
the main trope in our Canadian example.239  Health care specialists 
 
 234. For the implications of “lining up and paying off,” see, for example, ROSE-
ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION, supra note 221, at 85–88 (describing the market structure of 
bribery payments and countering arguments about their supposed efficiency). 
 235. MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY:  THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 17 
(2012). 
 236. Id. at 20. 
 237. Id. at 32. 
 238. For comparisons between fairness and efficiency considerations, see Perry & 
Zarsky, supra note 34 (adopting the framework of Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness 
Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001)). 
 239. Lisa Gregoire, Alberta's Hybrid Public-Private “Third Way”, 174 CANADIAN MED. 
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note that, with a growing demand and infrastructure of private care, 
the public system may be threatened.240  Recall that the main criti-
cism of Chaoulli was the method by which the Supreme Court up-
held a challenge to a universal social program, where the legal and 
practical inability to opt out of waiting lists––that is, the mandated 
queue––was a central requirement.241  Nonetheless, the regulation of 
physicians seeking to provide privately funded care outside of the 
system, or of patients seeking access, is both difficult and, suggests 
one commentator, politically thankless in recent years.242  Patients 
have paid to access private health care services abroad, thus weaken-
ing the argument against allowing private services in Canada.243  And 
patients’ rights litigation has been replicated in other provinces, such 
as Alberta and British Columbia, with Chaoulli being seen as “the 
first battle in a larger campaign” to create opportunities for private 
financing of medically necessary care.244  The “queue jumping” met-
aphor is used as a progressive defense of universal health care amidst 
the “common perception . . . that Canadians face unacceptable wait 
times for health care, and that the panacea is to allow private financ-
ing of medically necessary care.”245  Thus, perceptions of the illegit-
imacy of “queue jumping” in this context are mixed.  As the consum-
erist orientation of the modern state increases,246 the legitimacy of 
“queue jumping” in this sense, by market, may become more ac-
ceptable, and the metaphor may lose its local resonance. 
In South Africa, the market for an earlier place in the public 
housing queue is often inseparable from the corruption criticism, just 
as, in Australia, the payment of people smugglers is seen as a sign of 
corruption, or, at the very least, a clandestine “black market.”247  
 
ASS’N J. 1076 (2006). 
 240. See arguments in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.); 
Romanow Report, supra note 174. 
 241. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 242. Flood, supra note 174, at 83. 
 243. Bhatia, supra note 173, at 51–52. 
 244. Flood, supra note 174, at 96. 
 245. Id. at 83. 
 246. For a comparative map of this trend, see James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus 
Producerism:  A Study in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340 (2007); see also Bhatia, 
supra note 173, at 40 (describing a drift toward the acceptability of the individualized 
consumer); Colleen Flood et al., The Borders of Solidarity:  How Countries Determine the 
Public/Private Mix in Spending and the Impact on Health Care, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 297 
(2002) (noting the acceptability of “queue jumping” in health care distribution in Australia). 
 247. The rhetoric of “breaking the people smugglers’ business model” has appeared on 
both sides of politics in Australia.  See, e.g., Jeremy Thompson, High Court Scuttles 
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Nonetheless, there is an additional role for the market, which takes 
place when those who have been allocated subsidized houses and are 
prohibited from selling their home for eight years pass on the houses 
to those who can pay a higher amount.  These sales, which often go 
unregistered, fuel community perceptions of corruption in allocation, 
but also press upon fears of “downward-raiding” of public housing 
by richer individuals who have the means to pay.248  According to 
utilitarian principles of welfare and choice (that is, a sale based on 
the utility of individual buyers and sellers), these sales may appear 
perfectly legitimate. 
As Sandel notes, markets may have their appropriate place in 
social allocations; however, he suggests corruption may be endemic 
in markets in certain goods or opportunities.  He gives the example of 
the line-standing industry on Capitol Hill, which is an extension of 
the lobbying industry.249  The public has the opportunity to stand in 
line to participate.  But professional line-standers (often, as it turns 
out, homeless people) are hired by lobby groups, who capitalize on 
the arrangement.  This practice, suggests Sandel, is not illegal, nor is 
it non-transparent, but “degrades Congress by treating it as a source 
of private gain rather than an instrument of public good.”250  A simi-
lar criticism was made about subversion of the queueing practices 
that determine admission to popular hearings of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which recently revised admission rules to prohibit professional 
 
Malaysia Swap Deal, ABC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-08-
31/high-court-rules-on-asylum-seeker-challenge/2864218.  Nonetheless, the social 
acceptance of markets for entry has shifted in recent years.  For the (at the time) provocative 
suggestion of a market for visas, see Julian L. Simon, Auction the Right to Be an Immigrant, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1986 at A25, as reprinted in THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:  PROCESS AND POLICY 236–37 (5th ed. 2003).  Since 1990, 
and with dramatic uptake since 2008, the United States and other countries have created a 
visa for significant investors.  THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP:  PROCESS AND POLICY 343–48 (8th ed. 2016) (describing U.S. requirement of $1 
million (or $500,000 for investment in rural communities) for special EB5 visa, despite early 
criticism that “the rich should not be able to buy their way into this country”). 
 248. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 20, 70 (referring to Social Housing Policy, 
The National Housing Code 2009, vol. 6 pt.3 (S. Afr.), http://www.dhs.gov.za/sites/default/ 
files/documents/national_housing_2009/6_Social_Rental_Interventions/3%20Vol%206%20
Social%20Housing%20Policy.pdf). 
 249. SANDEL, supra note 235, at 5, 33–35. 
 250. Id. at 35.  For the widespread practice of professional queuers selling places in the 
queue for the visa section of the American Embassy, see Ha-Joon Chang, Poverty, 
Entrepreneurship, and Development, U.N. U. WORLD INST. FOR DEV. ECON. RES.:  WIDER 
ANGLE (Oct. 2010), https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/poverty-entrepreneurship-and-
development. 
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linestanding.251  Each case indicates how “market values are corro-
sive of certain goods but appropriate to others.”252  Better, for Sandel, 
is to defend the social condemnation of market-based queue jumping 
in certain cultural domains, such as “[t]he court hearing, the doctor’s 
surgery, and the supply of aid in an emergency.”253  The appropriate 
question in this respect is whether substantive claims of “rights” help 
to draw this distinction.  Certainly, a fuller conception of the role of 
rights in responding to claims of basic needs is required in order to 
work out when market competition is permissible and when it is 
not.254 
3. Government Versus Courts 
The third target of the “queue jumping” criticism is the use of 
courts.  When rights claimants––“queue jumpers”––bring their 
claims to courts, they are seen as jumping a queue devised elsewhere 
(by provincial bureaucracies, in South Africa’s case; or by medical 
experts in deliberation with government, in Canada; or by politics 
and diplomacy, in Australia).  Thus, this complaint accords with 
common understandings of the way in which the adjudication of 
rights is understood to “judicialize” the complex political decisions 
that go into the basic question of distribution and redistribution.  
While judicialization is a criticism that is also made about all consti-
tutional rights that are subject to judicial review,255 it is in the area of 
economic and social rights that it receives its strongest force.256  This 
criticism has been a main source of the long-standard argument 
against the “justiciability” of economic and social rights, and its 
 
 251. Pamela Karlan, Professor, Stanford Law Sch., The End of the Line:  Marriage 
Equality and Racial Equality at the Supreme Court (Nov. 12, 2015) (presented as the 2015 
David C. Baum Memorial Lecture on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, held by the University 
of Illinois College of Law) (on file with author). 
 252. SANDEL, supra note 235, at 35 (“The existence of socially acceptable limits to 
queue-jumping suggests a widespread public acknowledgment that there are spheres of 
culture where the queue is recognized as a better way to distribute resources than the 
market.”). 
 253. Id. at 35 (noting also the fluidity of these “queueing ethics”). 
 254. Thanks to Molly Doggett for the suggestion that rights for which there is no market 
competition are also rights for which there is no queue—on this see also FABRE, supra note 
14. 
 255. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 
YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). 
 256. E.g., Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001); 
Michelman, supra note 21 (describing this criticism). 
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strands relate to the distortion of public debate, the usurpation by the 
judiciary of the role of the elected branches, the inevitable vagueness 
and indeterminacy of such rights,257 and the uneven access to the 
courts as between the poor and middle class.258  In these terms, 
“queue jumping” becomes a shorthand complaint about accessing 
courts to deliver rights that have not been decided during legitimate 
and accountable political debate.259 
This is a criticism that has been fully internalized by courts in 
South Africa.  While the introduction of liberal constitutionalism and 
judicial review was central to the post-apartheid compromise and set-
tlement,260 and the centrality of courts was accepted for the realiza-
tion of economic and social rights,261 courts have repeatedly felt the 
need to address the “queue jumping” critique.  One of the central ar-
chitects of the new bill of rights, Albie Sachs, has suggested that 
ways must be found to ensure that those who are successful in their 
claims for economic and social rights are not those “with the sharpest 
elbows (and the best lawyers).”262  In the lower courts, they have 
done so by defending their choice of review and remedy (usually 
structural interdicts) in general terms.263  In the Constitutional Court, 
 
 257. Cross, supra note 256; Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:  Should There Be an International Complaints 
Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 462 (2004). 
 258. Cross, supra note 256; Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Harming the Poor Through 
Social Rights Litigation:  Lessons from Brazil, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1643 (2011); David Landau, 
The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189 (2012). 
 259. For a recent exploration, see Roach, supra note 165. 
 260. See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY:  LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH 
AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (2000); Albie Sachs, The Creation of South Africa’s 
Constitution, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 669, 673 (1997); see also RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS 
JURISTOCRACY:  THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). 
 261. Nicholas Haysom, Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-
Economic Rights, 8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 451 (1992) (arguing for constitutionlized 
economic and social rights on democracy grounds); Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of 
Luxuries:  Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 464 (1992) 
(arguing for the entrenchment of economic and social rights alongside a new culture of 
justification); cf. D.M. Davis, The Case Against Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in a 
Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles, 8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 475 (1992) 
(providing an early caution, later revised, against the involvement of courts in enforcing the 
constitutionalized economic and social rights). 
 262. ALBIE SACHS, THE STRANGE ALCHEMY OF LIFE AND LAW 181 (2009). 
 263. Mitra Ebadolahi, Note, Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human 
Rights Commission to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South 
Africa, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1565 (2008). 
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where these orders have often been repealed,264 the Court has sought 
to avoid pitting constitutional rights against each other (the most per-
tinent example being a refusal to balance the right to property against 
the right to housing),265 and to avoid individual remedies.266 
In Canada, the original debates against the Supreme Court ju-
dicial review of rights under the Canadian Charter have been resusci-
tated in the “queue jumping” guise.  The dissent written in the 
Chaoulli judgment is illustrative.  Despite the fact that the decision 
explicitly referenced “queue jumpers” as those who access the scarce 
medical resources outside of the public wait list, it was a dissent fo-
cused on the proper role of judges and the principle of deference.267  
Although the dissenting judges made a series of comments about the 
need for support for the principles of universal health care in Canada 
(which no party had contested), their opinion was taken up mainly 
with the urgency of keeping courts out of social questions and thus 
 
 264. Katharine G. Young, A Typology of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication:  
Exploring the Catalytic Function of Judicial Review, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 385 (2010). 
 265. Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v. Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd. 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) para. 22–24 (S. Afr.).); see also A.J. van der Walt, The 
State’s Duty to Protect Property Owners v the State’s Duty to Provide Housing:  Thoughts 
on the Modderklip Case, 21 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 144, 147 (2005). 
 266. The remedy of requiring a “meaningful engagement” between parties is one in 
which the winning claimant does not secure an individual remedy (such as title to housing, 
secured tenure, or even a guaranteed alternative accommodation) but rather a deliberation 
over available solutions to imminent homelessness.  See, e.g., City of Johannesburg Metro. 
Municipality v. Blue Moonlight Props. 39 (Pty) Ltd. 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) (S. Afr.); 
Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty. v. Thubelisha Homes 2011 (7) BCLR 723 (CC) (“Joe Slovo 
II”); Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v. Premier of the Province of KwaZulu Natal 
2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd., Berea Twp., and 197 Main St., 
Johannesburg v. City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also BRIAN RAY, 
ENGAGING WITH SOCIAL RIGHTS:  PROCEDURE, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA'S SECOND WAVE, ch. 9 (2016) (presenting an expanded vision of what might 
constitute a meaningful engagement); Sandra Liebenberg, The Democratic Turn in South 
Africa’s Social Rights Jurisprudence, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
(Katharine G. Young ed., forthcoming 2017)). 
 267. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, para. 161 (Can.); see also 
Martha Jackman, Charter Review as a Health Care Accountability Mechanism in Canada, 
18 HEALTH L.J. 1 (2010) (suggesting that such deference is inappropriate); Bruce Porter, A 
Right to Health Care in Canada:  Only if You Can Pay for It, ESR REV.:  ECON. & SOC. RTS. 
S. AFR., Nov. 2005, at 8, 10 (suggesting that manageable standards should have been set, and 
proposing the following questions: “What is treatment within a reasonable time? What are 
the benchmarks? How short a waiting list is short enough?”).  Porter argues that “these are 
the very issues that a court must be prepared to consider—and to give governments direction 
on—in assuming their role of guardians of the constitutional rights of all, including those 
who rely on the state for access to necessary health care.”  Id. 
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exclusively focused on legal questions.268  Such debates have contin-
ued to surface and are unresolved in Canada.269  The early Charter 
cases involving support for positive obligations under the right to life 
in Canada have not been developed,270 and there is a preference for 
“dialogic” remedies,271 which avoid the perception of individual 
remedy.  While this remedial form has its costs,272 advocates of the 
“weak-form” approach point to the fact that even unsuccessful cases 
in court have sometimes changed public opinion in the long run, par-
ticularly in the health care scenario.273 
In Australia, while the refugee issue has been so charged in 
the partisan-political context, perceptions of the appropriate role of 
courts, and the use of courts to defend the rights of asylum seekers, 
have been central to the controversies.274  Initially, the Federal Court 
of Australia was an active defender of the rights of asylum seekers 
under the Refugee Convention and its implementing legislation.275  
The Federal Court had made repeated awards overriding the denial of 
protection visas from the administrative tribunals below and hearing 
arguments against the developing policies of mandatory detention 
 
 268. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, para. 163 (Can.).  Judges 
Binnie and LeBel would require courts to determine scope of health services and length of 
wait times.  Id. 
 269. For an examination of the Supreme Court’s approach to the issue of assisted 
suicide, see Carter v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (Can.); Roach, supra note 
165, at 49–50. 
 270. See generally Gosselin v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (discussing 
positive obligations flowing from section 7) (Arbour and L‘Heureux-Dube, JJ., dissenting); 
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (discussing positive 
obligations flowing from section 15). 
 271. Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 
S.C.R. 69, para 258 (Can.) (Iacobucci, J., dissenting) (“[D]eclarations are often preferable to 
injunctive relief because they are more flexible, require less supervision, and are more 
deferential to the other branches of government. However, declarations can suffer from 
vagueness, insufficient remedial specificity, an inability to monitor compliance, and an 
ensuing need for subsequent litigation to ensure compliance.”); see also TUSHNET, supra 
note 7; Dixon, supra note 114; Young, supra note 264. 
 272. Roach, supra note 165 (noting the double-standards of such approaches and the 
risk they pose to judicial legitimacy, and advocating instead a “two-track” combination of 
strong and weak remedies).  Compare Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v. Canada (Att’y 
Gen.), 2014 FC 651 (Can.) (approving refugee’s health care claim with suspended remedy), 
with Roach, supra note 165, at 41–42 (suggesting an alternative remedial approach to the 
case). 
 273. Flood, supra note 185. 
 274. E.g., Crock, supra note 206. 
 275. Id. at 60 (noting the discipline from the Minister to the Refugee Review Tribunal in 
1997 and forbiddance of the “re-invent[ion]” of the definition of refugee). 
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and offshore processing.276  However, their role was circumscribed 
by the introduction of a series of privative clauses, which operated to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in such cases.277  At this 
point, the High Court of Australia became the main source of appeal 
in immigration decisions.  Its judgments––particularly in the contro-
versial Tampa incident, but also in cases involving the legality of in-
definite detention in Australia278––have arguably been influenced by 
perceptions of the appropriate limits to the judicial role.279  In cases 
in which the courts have explicitly recognized the discourse of 
“queue jumping,” they have rejected it as a consideration in merits 
determinations.280 
The answering trope to the connotations of “queue jumping” 
through courts lies in the characterization of judicial review in consti-
tutional democracy.  If courts are charged with adjudicating rights, it 
should follow that a successful claim results in the correct application 
of extant queueing principles, rather than the subversion of them.  
While it is clear that such justification is less likely to be required in 
civil and political rights cases (where successful rights claims are 
more easily understood as protecting the rights of everyone),281 there 
are queues established by such claims as well––think of Brown II, for 
example.282  In that case, the order to desegregate “with all deliberate 
speed” permitted a wide variety of re-ordering systems with an un-
 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id.; Simon Evans, Australia, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 123 (2003). 
 278. For further background, see BRENNAN, supra note 203. 
 279. Crock, supra note 206.  For a candid account of the challenges of jurisdiction in 
this area, see Stephen Sedley, Asylum:  Can the Judiciary Maintain its Independence?, in 
STEMMING THE TIDE OR KEEPING THE BALANCE—THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 319 (New 
Zealand Association for Comparative Law eds., 2002), http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/ 
stories/WorldConferences/5-2002-wellington.pdf. 
 280. E.g., Surinakova v Minister of Immigration Local Gov’t and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 
33 FCR 87 (Austl.); Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Gov’t and Ethnic Affairs 
(1994) 48 FCR 83, 85 (referring to the policy of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs to prevent “queue jumping,” at the time of “immigration selection procedures and/or 
breaches of undertakings given in securing entry to Australia.”); David John Lally v Minister 
of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 1 (17 January 1985) (Austl.); Kioa v West 
(1985) 159 CLR. 550 (Austl.). 
 281. E.g., DWORKIN, supra note 6. 
 282. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (“Brown II”) was the 
remedial follow-up to the Supreme Court’s holding that “separate but equal” was 
incompatible with constitutional equal protection under Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954).  In Brown II, the Supreme Court ordered states to desegregate schools 
“with all deliberate speed.”  Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
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specified time.283  Even in a desegregation case involving higher ed-
ucation, in which Brown rather than Brown II was held to apply, eva-
sion continued.284  A fuller analysis is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, but it can be observed that the issue of queue jumping via courts 
is clearly more complex than a discussion of the appropriate role of 
the judicial branch.  Answers to this complaint will vary in their em-
phasis on the substance of rights or the procedures for protection, 
such as the protection of discrete and insular minorities;285 other 
forms of liberty- or dignity-protecting measures;286 or the astute de-
sign of remedies that can circumvent the challenges of “queue jump-
ing” through courts.287  On the more procedural end of these theories 
lie conceptions of “destabilization rights,”288 perhaps the most explic-
it challenge to extant queueing systems. 
B. Obfuscations 
There is thus, as we have seen, a number of differently per-
ceived wrongs––by administrators, markets, and courts––that give 
 
 283. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.  This phrase “could neither constrain evasion nor bolster 
compliance.”  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 318 (2004).  As Klarman notes, the court 
omitted any comment on the constitutionality of the mechanisms of ordering, including 
queue design, that could be used to circumvent desegregation, such as, among others:  pupil 
placement schemes, which assigned students to schools based on a long list of ostensibly 
race-neutral criteria; transfer options, which permitted parents to move their children out of 
desegregated schools; and grade-a-year plans, which started desegregation in the first or 
twelfth grade and then expanded it to one additional grade every year.  See id. at 316–18, 
349–63. 
 284. KLARMAN, supra note 283, at 256–58 (discussing the appeal by Virgil Hawkins to 
enter a white-only university). 
 285. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); cf. 
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (presenting 
concern for those that have neither discrete, insular, nor minority status). 
 286. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 6, with FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND 
DEMOCRACY (1999) (suggesting different paths forward in the U.S. context). 
 287. TUSHNET, supra note 7; YOUNG, supra note 14;  Roach, supra note 165 (drawing 
on comparative examples of different models of review and different models of remedy). 
 288. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:  How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004) (presenting methods to disentrench 
bureaucratic power, including inevitable inertias built into administrative systems); see also 
CÉSAR RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO & DIANA RODRÍGUEZ-FRANCO, RADICAL DEPRIVATION ON 
TRIAL:  THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
SOUTH 63–75 (2015) (describing the judicial “unlocking” of the state apparatus, as well as 
other effects, that are evidenced by recent decisions of the Colombian Constitutional Court). 
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rise to the “queue jumping” complaint.  Yet a discourse of rights fo-
cused on duties on the state to respect, protect, and fulfill them would 
signal certain avenues for redress.  The queue is maintained as a re-
spectable and transparent default mechanism for distribution, but is 
discarded in respect of exceptional needs, much like an ambulance is 
allowed to bypass other vehicles and traffic signals.  Even informal 
queueing systems internalize some criteria for permitting “queue 
jumping,” and, depending upon the stakes involved, the criteria may 
be notably lax.289  Nonetheless, if too many exceptions are made, 
support for the queue is eventually undermined.  In this way, rights 
and queues have a parasitic, but contradictory, relation. 
Yet, it will be seen that the focus on queues conceals many of 
the more important questions about the socio-economic distributions 
at stake.  In this sense, instead of providing a straightforward mecha-
nism for distribution in conditions of scarcity, and providing order to 
such distribution, the queue serves to distract from highly relevant 
and political questions of rights, access to material goods and ser-
vices, and distributive justice.  This section notes how, in cases of 
housing, health care, and refugee claims, the queue obfuscates rights 
at the same time as it draws attention to them. 
There are, for example, initial questions about the production 
of scarce resources (how many houses? how much health care? how 
many humanitarian visas?) that involve population-wide resource de-
cisions that are rendered invisible to those focused on “the queue.”  
These we might call the first-order decisions, which are left uncon-
tested.290  There are also other issues, and competing beneficiaries, 
that are avoided by a focus on queues, such as, for example, mort-
gage subsidies in housing, social determinants and health, or entrants 
who overstay their visas.  In such cases, the queue offers a category 
 
 289. See, e.g., Ellen Langer et al., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action:  
The Role of “Placebic” Information in Interpersonal Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 635, 637 (1978) (finding that even an empty, “placebic” request—“May I use the 
xerox machine, because I have to make copies?”—would be perceived as sufficient 
justification to permit someone to cut in line).  For the influence of this research in 
behavioral economics, see Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:  Psychology for 
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003). 
 290. E.g., CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 4, at 19 (noting that, in confronting any 
decision about a scarce good, society must first “decide how much of it will be produced, 
within the limits set by natural scarcity, and also who shall get what is made, triggering a 
succession of decision, rationalization, and violence.”); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE 
FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:  ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 73–83 (2016) 
(updating an approach that considers that goods such as basic education, health care, and 
environmental protection should not merely be allocated on the basis of existing wealth 
distribution). 
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of thought supported, if not imposed, by the state291 that obscures the 
stakes of distributions and the effect on rights.  This Part first de-
scribes how such obfuscations play out in each policy domain, before 
addressing the stakes of rights and queues in general. 
1. Housing Allocations 
Discourses on the right to housing can become dominated by 
perceptions of a housing queue, and of opportunistic breaches of this 
queue.  And yet the queue is the veritable tip of the iceberg in the dis-
tributive and redistributive decisions that are made about the alloca-
tion of publicly-subsidized housing.  The housing waiting list repre-
sents a small number of the decisions made about housing and can 
only represent such a fraction, in South Africa just as elsewhere. 
As a right, housing represents a safe and secure space that 
shields one from the elements and provides refuge from external 
physical threats.292  Housing provides a material base from which to 
build a livelihood and take part in the life of the community.293  And 
it provides a space where psychological needs can be met.294  But the 
right to housing can be realized by different forms of fixed dwelling–
–the affordability of one’s own house, for example, but also access to 
a service or accommodation (with some security of tenure).295  There 
is an irrepressible social aspect of the right to housing––that is, the 
spatial relationship of the home to other houses, workplaces, schools, 
 
 291. Like Pierre Bourdieu, we may simply find out that “one of the major powers of the 
state is to produce and impose . . . categories of thought that we spontaneously apply to all 
things of the social world—including the state itself.”  Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking the State:  
Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, 12 SOC. THEORY 1, 1 (1994). 
 292. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4:  
The Right to Adequate Housing (art. 11(1) of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1992). 
 293. E.g., Oldfield & Greyling, supra note 124. 
 294. HOHMANN, supra note 161, at 4–5. 
 295. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7:  The Right to 
Adequate Housing (art. 11(1) of the Covenant):  Forced Evictions, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 
(1997) [hereinafter General Comment No. 7]; Tony Fahey & Michelle Norris, Housing, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE WELFARE STATE 479, 482 (Francis G. Castles et al., eds. 
2010) (noting, amongst other observations, how “owning” and “renting” represent different 
bundles of legal rights in various regimes, but that long-term rights over housing as capital 
and shorter-term rights over housing as service is a useful distinction); see also I.D.G. v. 
Spain, supra note 25 (noting procedural entitlements before foreclosure); Raquel Rolnik & 
Lidia Rabinovich, Late-neoliberalism:  The Financialization of Homeownership and the 
Housing Rights of the Poor, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 26, at 57. 
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shops, and a web of social relations is important.296  The notion of a 
queue limits the complexities of rights realization, just as it limits 
claims. The discourse of housing rights can extend to the issue of 
women’s exclusion from holding property rights,297 or to the restitu-
tion interests of internally displaced persons.298  Forced and arbitrary 
evictions do, of course, point to clear infringements of the right to 
housing,299 but advocates of the right are also concerned about the 
other myriad forms of insecurity of tenure, and of the demands on 
human dignity and freedom presented by population shifts, mobility, 
financialization, and displacements.300  None of this complexity is 
addressed by the focus on the queue. 
For example, in South Africa, since at least 2001, there has 
been a decline in state-subsidized housing delivery and a shift to-
wards informal settlement upgrading and the provision of subsidized 
rental housing.301  This change has meant that location has become a 
more important criterion than waiting time in determining a person’s 
access to subsidized housing because in situ housing projects and ar-
ea-based projects rely on local residents.  In temporal terms, waiting 
lists are turned to after a housing project is identified for develop-
ment, and has been developed, thus diminishing the importance of 
the list in first-order decisions.  Added to this are the other unavoida-
ble political realities:  there are area-specific upgrading agendas;302 
housing implementation is supply driven;303 and the strategy of creat-
ing “mixed” neighborhoods that desegregate communities may create 
 
 296. HOHMANN, supra note 161, at 27 (particularly important in resettlement, where 
alternative accommodation has been constructed for evictees or those subject to voluntary 
relocation); JIM KEMENY, HOUSING AND SOCIAL THEORY 159 (1992); see also Kyra Olds, 
Comment, The Role of Courts in Making the Right to Housing a Reality Throughout Europe:  
Lessons from France and the Netherlands, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 170, 190 (2010). 
 297. HOHMANN, supra note 161, at 39 (noting small attention to housing in CEDAW, 
despite the fact of “women’s exclusion from the home as a matter of law and the 
simultaneity of this exclusion with women’s profound connection to the home in ideology 
and practice”). 
 298. Id. at 1. 
 299. See, e.g., General Comment No. 7, supra note 295. 
 300. HOHMANN, supra note 161, at 23. 
 301. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., DEP’T OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS., supra note 140; TISSINGTON 
ET AL., supra note 120, at 15–18 (detailing the shift towards a public-sector approach in 2001 
and the later development, in 2004, of the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme 
(UISP) (Chapter 13 of the National Housing Code) as part of the Breaking New Ground 
program). 
 302. Royston & Eglin, supra note 122, at 9. 
 303. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 59. 
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other social problems.304 
Moreover, the waiting list itself creates its own problems of 
administration:  it does not cater to the growth and split of families 
over time; it accommodates other special needs or other criteria in of-
ten uncertain ways; there are practices of “multiple” waiting lists;305 
and “gaps” in the purportedly transparent program have been report-
ed in terms of identifying beneficiaries, screening beneficiaries, de-
ploying the appropriate criteria, and educating beneficiaries.306  In the 
large province of the Western Cape in South Africa, for example, 
more than half of the households on the waiting list who are living in 
informal settlements have been on the list for five or more years.307  
Housing allocations are thus the mirror side of evictions policies.  
These latter decisions are made on the basis of a “special cluster of 
legal relationships” between a municipality and the residents of its 
jurisdiction, which “possess an ongoing, organic and dynamic char-
acter that evolves over time.”308  In such cases, a “one-fits-all solu-
tion in eviction cases is, therefore, not only unworkable but also un-
acceptable.”309 
In a representative example, the Alexandra Renewal Project 
in Johannesburg departed from the waiting list approach to a “block-
by-block” allocation strategy, with a result that: 
 
 304. JEREMY SEEKINGS ET AL., THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ESTABLISHING ‘MIXED’ 
NEIGHBOURHOODS 1 (May 2010), http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/sites/cssr.uct.ac.za/files/pubs/ 
SocialConsequences.pdf (suggesting that waiting lists lead to mixed (racial and place of 
origin) communities, especially sourced from those living in backyard shacks or 
overcrowded formal housing rather than informal settlements, but that case studies suggest 
that they may have “a lower quality of ‘community’ and, perhaps because of this, would be 
more prone to violent conflict”). 
 305. Rubin, supra note 227, at 484 (documenting the choice of a municipality to replace 
the old “waiting list” with a “demand database” to allocate housing). 
 306. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 38; see also id. at 39 (noting that, according 
to the Gauteng Department of Local Government and Housing, updated information 
captured by a newer Housing Demand Database is now intended to, amongst other things, 
“prioritise beneficiaries with special needs (these beneficiaries are identified as the aged, 
disabled, families, child-headed households and destitute military veterans)” and to “[a]ssist 
municipalities in counteracting ‘queue-jumping’ by land invaders”). 
 307. Id. at 27–28. 
 308. Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty. W. Cape v. Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) 
para. 343 (S. Afr.).  For its extension to the duties of local authorities to provide electricity, 
see Joseph v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also Muller & 
Liebenberg, supra note 133, at 562–65. 
 309. Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Limited v. Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and 
Another [2008] ZAGPHC 275 (HC, WLD) para. 64  (S. Afr.); Muller & Liebenberg, supra 
note 133, at 566. 
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[R]eprioritised limited resources from one poor group 
to another.  The housing waiting list approach meant 
that it would be primarily old residents who were on 
the waiting list who would benefit, but the block by 
block approach changed this completely by benefiting 
primarily shack dwellers and excluding and frustrating 
those who had been on the waiting list.310 
Moreover, of course, the decisions to switch to informal upgrading or 
alternative tenure arrangements are also made in the context of decid-
ing how many houses are being built:  a first-order decision that is 
recognized, but is a less constant source of complaint.311 
2. Health Care Allocations 
The allocation of health care is similarly determined by a 
myriad of decisions that are hidden by the “queue jumping” meta-
phor.  Indeed, the metaphor exaggerates a general bias in thinking 
about health in curative, treatment, terms.312  Yet as analysts are 
quick to point out, the background questions of inequality and the so-
cial determinants of health––access to education, food, and water, to 
name a few––play a larger role in determining the justice of the over-
all system and its distribution of health.313 
In Canada, the health care wait list is a fractional component 
of the decisions made about the realization of health rights.  Three is-
sues, arguably more central to the realization of such rights, relate to 
the decision as to what is, and what is not, included in the publicly 
financed system, as well as how the large private market is regulated 
and how the social determinants of health are addressed.  First, the 
demarcation of what should be publicly funded, “medically neces-
sary” hospital care and “medically required” physician services are 
annually negotiated at the provincial level by Health Ministries and 
Medical Associations.314  But these negotiations are primarily limited 
 
 310. Luke Sinwell, The Alexandra Development Forum (ADF):  The Tyranny of Invited 
Participatory Spaces?, 74 TRANSFORMATION:  CRITICAL PERSP. ON SOUTHERN AFR. 23, 38–
39 (2010). 
 311. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 68. 
 312. For criticism of this bias, see PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER:  HEALTH, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR (2003); see also General Comment No. 14, 
supra note 80. 
 313. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH:  MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY (2008); General 
Comment No. 14, supra note 80. 
 314. Flood, supra note 174, at 79. 
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to costs rather than what aspects of care and services are to be in-
cluded or excluded.315  This preserves the status quo, a default.316  
Secondly, despite perceptions to the contrary, Canada is only nomi-
nally a “single payer” system, with 30% of health care privately fi-
nanced, and 65% of Canadians holding private insurance for such 
services as prescription drugs and dental care.317  Thus, when not 
deemed medically necessarily, treatment is “left largely to the free 
market to determine who has access, leading to serious inequalities in 
access and quality of care” in critical areas of health care, exempli-
fied by the issue of access to pharmaceuticals.318  As Colleen Flood 
has cautioned, “[p]eering beyond the boundaries of what is deemed, 
somewhat arbitrarily, to be medically necessary, one finds profound 
inequalities, with vulnerable populations denied access or receiving 
sub-standard care.”319  Thirdly, the question of public spending 
across a range of social services vital to health, such as the provision 
of water and sanitation, is barely registered as a health-related deci-
sion.  These social determinants are thus missed. 
Why the Canadian debate over equitable access to health care 
centers not on these issues (the lack of comprehensiveness of public 
coverage, inadequate regulation of the private sector, and broader so-
cioeconomic inequalities) but instead on aspects of the “single-payer” 
system is another feature of the resonance of the “queue jumping” 
metaphor and its intrinsic appeal.  Queue talk has coincided with a 
shift to what has been called a “negative” or “civil” right to health 
care,320 and the obfuscation of the ways in which health care out-
comes are both individually allocated and broadly distributed. 
 
 315. TUOHY, supra note 173, at 217–21 (describing the processes of “delisting” from 
what is deemed necessary); Flood, supra note 174, at 79–80; Aeyal Gross, Is There a Human 
Right to Private Health Care?, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 138, 143 (2013) (noting the 
importance of the inclusion of a comprehensive range of health care services, at sufficient 
quality, in the publicly subsidized tier of a two-tier system). 
 316. Flood, supra note 174, at 79–80.  For a suggestion of more participatory aspects to 
such processes, and the removal of professional and market capture, see Alana Klein, So 
Long as You Have Your Health:  Health Care Distribution in Canada and Proceduralist 
Human Rights, 30 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 247 (2012). 
 317. Flood, supra note 174, at 79 (providing comparative examples). 
 318. Id. at 80; see also Flood et al., supra note 246.  The complex ways in which 
pharmaceutical financing impact the accessibility of health services and human rights are 
presented in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH:  PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010). 
 319. Flood, supra note 174, at 81. 
 320. Bhatia, supra note 173, at 38; Flood, supra note 174, at 95–96.  For a different 
formulation of the right to health care, based on both negative and positive obligations, see 
Jackman, supra note 267; see also General Comment No. 14, supra note 80. 
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3. Asylum-Seeker Processing 
In Australia, the queue can be seen to obscure the fact that 
“states allow for more mobility across their borders than they pre-
vent.”321  Many of the first-order decisions on immigration are made 
outside of the refugee debate; just as many of the applicants for asy-
lum are produced, not by the attractiveness of the good in question 
(access to Australia), but by “push” factors such as civil war, conflict, 
poverty, and even climate-induced displacements.322  Moreover, 
while the grounds for distributional decision-making in this context 
are very different from the more bounded contexts of access to na-
tional housing or health care discussed above,323 queue talk empha-
sizes the same construction of competition in housing, health care, 
and other state transfers that make the rights of non-nationals politi-
cally unpopular.324 
Recall that the Refugee Convention sets out a framework for 
processing claims to asylum, along with the principle of non-
refoulement, to protect victims of political or religious persecution 
who are understood as making the most forceful claim for admission 
to any country to which all States Parties agree.325  Even if a coun-
try’s immigration policy—and the choice of whom to admit and 
 
 321. VIGNESWARAN, supra note 202, at 109. 
 322. A point made poignantly clear with the unprecedented rise in global forced 
displacement over the last three years.  See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WORLD AT 
WAR:  UNHCR GLOBAL TRENDS:  FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2014 (2015), 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/country/556725e69/unhcr-global-trends-2014.html 
(stressing major movements, with the starkest increase from Syria, Afghanistan, and 
Somalia); supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.  For the different causal effects, see 
HUMAN SECURITY AND NON-CITIZENS:  LAW, POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Alice 
Edwards & Carla Ferstman eds., 2010).  See further the ways in which international human 
rights standards operate as a benchmark in the case law which elucidates the meaning of 
“serious harm,” from which people are entitled to seek refugee status.  HATHAWAY & 
FOSTER, supra note 207, at 182–287. 
 323. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 324. The entry of asylum seekers puts additional pressure on the public queues—
discussed in both housing and health care scenarios—at an administrative level, but also a 
political one, in South Africa and Canada no less than in other systems.  See, e.g., Jackman, 
supra note 267, at 10–11, 24–25 (discussing caselaw denying health care coverage to 
undocumented migrants); Tara Polzer Ngwato & Zaheera Jinnah, Migrants and Mobilisation 
Around Socio-Economic Rights, in SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA:  SYMBOLS OR 
SUBSTANCE? 389, 396–417 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2014) (describing formal and 
informal obstacles to rights protections for non-nationals in South Africa, despite 
constitutional and statutory protections). 
 325. For an extension of such protection to human rights, see JANE MCADAM, 
COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (2007). 
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whom to exclude—is at the heart of its self-determination,326 it is 
subject to a basic principle of mutual aid.  With its sea borders and 
geographical position, Australia is one of the few countries in which 
the ability to achieve near perfect control of immigration is a credible 
goal.  It is these features that have led to a surprisingly draconian 
mainstream political discourse, as compared with other recipient 
countries.  Of course, the “queue” must be administered outside of 
Australia, and the discourse never entertains a realistic analysis of the 
capacities of the UNHCR, or any other global administrative process, 
to satisfy the conditions of fairness and order that are theoretically of-
fered by queues.327  Rather, queue talk obscures its inevitable effect–
–the rejection of rights to asylum––by suggesting an overall rights-
approving stance, as long as claimants wait their turn. 
Scarcity, or the fact that all asylum seekers cannot be granted 
protection simultaneously, appears to be an inevitable feature, and 
yet scarcity is as much a political construct as it is a material fact.  As 
David Martin has argued, “[a]sylum’s scarcity is political . . . not 
physical.”328  In this case too, attention to the queue obscures the 
countervailing political traditions that might help to decrease the 
scarcity of political will:  not only of human rights, but others that 
 
 326. WALZER, supra note 103, at 51; see, e.g., Andrew Shacknove, From Asylum to 
Containment, 5 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 516, 521–22 (1993) (noting that “[o]nly isolated States, 
such as Britain, Japan, and Australia, may be capable of” preventing large scale entry); cf. 
Gibney, supra note 219, at 173. (questioning Walzer’s baseline, that liberal states are 
entitled to protect their “shared sense of what they are about” as an internally variable 
standard).  The recent crisis in Europe highlights the difference in entry-points between 
different states of the Global North. 
 327. Only one percent of refugees are resettled through the UNHCR program, and it has 
been estimated that to fulfill the resettlement aims of this program would take 117 years.  
See, e.g., McAdam, supra note 195, at 447.  Commentators have stressed the importance of 
domestic implementation.  See, e.g., Gil Loescher & James Milner, supra note 196, at 190 
(noting that, while UNHCR is the “central actor of the global refugee regime,” its “power 
and influence has been eroded as a result of both the changing dynamics of forced migration 
and the changing interests of states”).  For gaps in procedural fairness in UNHCR’s 
processing, see Michael Kagan, The Beleaguered Gatekeeper:  Protection Challenges Posed 
by UNHCR Refugee Status Determination, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 1–2, 9 (2006) (noting 
problems that remain unaddressed, despite the efforts by the UNHCR to set “Procedural 
Standards for Refugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate” in September 2005).  
For a detailed ethnography of “new illegalities” and “corrupt practices” that accompany such 
soft law measures, see Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, Blurring Boundaries: Refugee Resettlement 
in Kampala—Between the Formal, the Informal, and the Illegal, 34 PoLAR: POL. & LEGAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 11, 12–13 (2011). 
 328. David A. Martin, The Refugee Concept:  On Definitions, Politics, and the Careful 
Use of a Scarce Resource, in REFUGEE POLICY:  CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 30, 36 
(Howard Adelman ed., 1991). 
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emphasize non-discrimination, for example, or otherwise eschew an-
ti-immigration rhetoric.329  Effective political responses in liberal 
democracies may depend, as other commentators have argued, on 
how a variety of factors are represented and understood in particular 
country contexts, such as the needs of those seeking asylum, and per-
haps their number (as against the host state’s population); the host 
state’s economy; particular ethnic affinities; the history of integra-
tion; and how other states are behaving towards entrants.330  Queue 
talk simply passes over such factors. 
C. The Stakes of Rights and Queues 
The unresolved questions, and obfuscations, that are produced 
by the queue’s role as metaphor and concept, distort the democratic 
political space in which we expect our normative commitments to 
rights to play out.  As discussed above, distributive allocations made 
in conditions of scarcity are popularly, and often intuitively, under-
stood in terms of queues.  It is my final contention that this may be 
highly distortive of rights talk, particularly for claimants in the most 
desperate positions.  In addition to the unresolved questions and ob-
fuscations discussed above, the discourse of “queue jumping” places 
a burden on rights-claimants to justify their claim and may set up 
conditions of anti-solidarity, and indeed enmity, on behalf of differ-
ently situated rights-holders whose claims may be less urgent.331 
This is because “queue jumpers” are perceived as having mis-
appropriated otherwise legitimate criteria––the criteria of need––and 
are therefore moving up the system of allocation illegitimately.  
Again, there are links to perceptions of “corruption,” but the argu-
ment is separate and has a particularly disempowering effect on 
rights claimants. 
First, in South Africa’s example, the “queue jumper” is the 
homeless person, or squatter, whose very need and vulnerability are 
grounds for their claim for housing, or to the anti-eviction protections 
 
 329. See, e.g., Ngwato & Jinnah, supra note 324, at 397 (noting worker-solidarity 
traditions, or pan-African expressions in South Africa, as well as the fact that major political 
parties have eschewed such rhetoric in their policy platforms there, unlike in other developed 
and developing countries). 
 330. Gibney, supra note 219, at 176–77.  It should be noted that Gibney uses these 
elements to approve a policy that does not privilege the claims of needy people on the 
grounds of proximity (like maritime boat arrivals). 
 331. That this consequence is contingent is made clear in comparing the queue talk 
deployed in Canada and South Africa.  My thanks to Mattias Kumm for help with this point. 
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accorded by the state.332  In a sense, the “queue jumper” is perceived 
as racing to the bottom of the needs-based hierarchy in order to be 
first served.  There is an assumption of active agency by the “queue 
jumper,” and a selfish disregard for others who are waiting patiently 
in the system.  Second, in the Australian case study, the boat arrivals 
are perceived as risking life and limb inappropriately, rather than 
waiting their turn.333  While, in pursuing legal recognition, asylum 
seekers’ passivity is well-documented, it is at the moment that they 
assert agency that their claims become so unpopular.334 
This criticism is directed to individuals, but it also applies to 
communities seeking to organize with particular results.  For exam-
ple, in South Africa: 
If an organised community takes initiative, or wins a 
court case, then the public system is not very adept at 
being responsive to a departure from the “waiting pa-
tiently” (for your name to come up on a waiting list) 
mentality.  It could be said that this mind set has actu-
ally disempowered people over the last fifteen years or 
so, as it has undermined some community’s ability or 
will power to get on with it themselves.  In contrast, 
some of the social movements stand in contrast to this 
(“nothing for us without us”).335 
In this way, the waiting list stands in as a “tool of political and social 
control in housing delivery,”336 no less than in asylum claims.  
“Queue jumping” may thus be seen as a “blame frame” that is used 
by those who must be passive in the face of inequities of others,337 
 
 332. Prevention of Illegal Evictions and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
§§ 4, 6 (S. Afr.). 
 333. McAdam, supra note 195, at 439 (noting the way the policy, adopted only by 
Australia “pits onshore and offshore applicants against each other by creating a system in 
which onshore applicants are seen as ‘taking’ places which could be used to resettle family 
members”). 
 334. Matthew Zagor, Recognition and Narrative Identities:  Is Refugee Law 
Redeemable?, in ALLEGIANCE AND IDENTITY IN A GLOBALISED WORLD 311 (Fiona Jenkins et 
al. eds., 2014) (noting that, as reinforcement of the stereotype of passivity, “the refugee who 
displays too much autonomy is portrayed as duplicitous, a queue jumper, opportunist and 
liar”); Roger Zetter, Labelling Refugees:  Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic 
Identity, 4 J. REFUGEE STUD. 39 (1991) (describing the institutions responsible for the 
shaping of the refugee narrative). 
 335. Royston & Eglin, supra note 122, at 4–5. 
 336. TISSINGTON ET AL., supra note 120, at 58.  There is a related fear by some that the 
“‘so-called database’ may be used as evidence in court to evict people by claiming that 
people are ‘queue-jumping.’”  Id. at 62. 
 337. Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame:  Justifying (Racial) Injustice 
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but one that is peculiarly hostile to the political agency exercised by 
unpopular groups––in comparison with common tropes of “welfare 
queens” or “dependents,”338 which invoke passivity, rather than 
agency, as the source of blame.  The consequence is to undermine the 
very norm of individual agency that the recognition of rights purports 
to mobilize.  Unlike the legal stakes of the classifications of rights 
and queues, described in Part I above, in which we observe constitu-
tional or human rights co-existing with an administrative structure of 
queues in varied relations, the political stakes of such classifications 
work on a metaphorical level and, as such, may represent a greater 
challenge to the implementation of human rights. 
The discourse of queues and “queue jumping” is one that op-
erates perniciously to treat queues as creating ancillary rights, which, 
in apparent support of order and collective fairness, must trump the 
claims of others.  This contradictory result may be seen as distinct 
from the perceptions of the liberty-affirming politics that arise by 
claiming and litigating other human rights:  one person’s guarantee of 
free speech is thought to assist the free speech of others, not unsettle 
or rival it.  It was T.H. Marshall’s thesis that a grant of social rights 
would lead to an ever-widening protection, such that one person’s 
successful claim of social security would lead to the social security of 
others.339  But in the “queue jumping” discourse, one person’s recog-
nition of rights can do precisely the opposite.  These are the less ob-
vious stakes of queue talk. 
 
in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 419 (2006) (discussing the social psychology 
of understandings of fairness that is upheld through blaming victims of inequities and 
excuses perpetrators or passive observers).  For a pertinent U.S. example, see ARLIE 
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND:  ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE 
AMERICAN RIGHT 152 (2016) (noting the power of the queue metaphor, particularly in 
conservative rural communities in America, in expressing hostility against the state and 
others, whereby the “federal government [is perceived as] on the side of those unjustly 
‘cutting in’ [minorities, women, immigrants, refugees, and public sector employees],” while 
the “free market [is perceived as] the unwavering ally of the good citizens waiting in line”). 
 338. For examples of each, see HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 100, at 159 (noting 
that “[t]he ‘welfare queen’ myth is the joining of two stereotypes:  race and the 
‘underserving poor’”); Fraser & Gordon, supra note 107, at 321 (showing how the keyword 
of “dependency” distorts welfare policy). 
 339. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in INEQUALITY AND SOCIETY:  SOCIAL 
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 148 (Jeff Manza & Michael Sauder eds., 
2009). 
yuiosdfsd  
2016] RIGHTS AND QUEUES 137 
CONCLUSION 
In the age of rights, the queue is seen to represent a system in 
which legitimate claims are ordered and rendered orderly by a recog-
nizable system of allocation.  And yet, when people seek to access 
their constitutional or human rights through making claims upon the 
state, they are often perceived as “queue jumpers” who are con-
travening the norms of the queue, conflicting with extant allocative 
schemes, and dislodging the claims of others waiting for the same re-
sources and opportunities.  Rights in modern States give rise to 
queues, and yet are invoked discursively both to unsettle present 
queues and to admonish those who attempt to do so.  This Article has 
sought to unsettle the metaphors of the queue and “queue jumping” 
in the three examples of housing rights in South Africa, health care 
claims in Canada, and asylum claims in Australia.  This has revealed 
very different complaints harbored within “queue talk”:  against 
courts, administrators, markets, and claimants themselves.  A sophis-
ticated discourse of rights, which acknowledges the breadth of the 
correlative duties to respect, protect, and fulfill, is a potential rejoin-
der.  Rights can co-exist with queues, and be supported by principles 
of administrative fairness, where the queue operates as a default 
norm of allocation, which may be abrogated when important claims 
of human dignity, liberty, justice, or fairness require it.  Yet to treat 
the queue at face value is to overlook its deceptive appeal.  The first-
order distributional decisions that force some into queues and allow 
some to exist outside of them, are also appropriately part of our un-
derstanding of rights.  Of course, one may question the pursuit of ra-
tional answers to metaphoric conceptions arguably immovable by 
logic.  Yet I suggest that analytical attention can explain the different 
sources of the power of the metaphor, and therefore different sources 
of redress. 
